4 ms·
I'm pessimistic about this type of technology because it isn't "you" that we are talking about; it's a copy of you; you still get to die, and I don't think that
by sodiumphosphate 14y ago
I'm pessimistic about this type of technology because it isn't "you" that we are talking about; it's a copy of you; you still get to die, and I don't think that knowing a copy of your mind exists will be of any real comfort.
- ericb 14y agoExactly. It baffles me that even very smart people can't see this bug. If it can theoretically exist separately while you are alive, it can't be you. For example, if You and Digital You (tm) were alive at the same time, I could put you in one room, and Digital You in another, and smash Digital You without You having any idea. You could live your whole life not knowing if Digital You was "alive." Whatever your definition of me is, it seems like me dying should have an effect on me.
- maxerickson 14y agoIn "Altered Carbon", a character that has lived for hundreds of years destroys an instance of his self in order to prevent the upload of a mind virus into a backup copy of his self. In doing so, he loses a few days of experience. Is that situation utterly contrived because he destroyed his mind, or are you insisting on a limited definition of self? (Let's set aside the part where there is mind replicating technology but no snapshots or version control)
- ericb 14y agoI view self as an instance of an object.