4 ms·

Spot on! That was indeed what I was imagining. If the soldier had to enter a PIN each day, for instance (a kind of dead man's switch), and assuming the enemy is

Spot on! That was indeed what I was imagining. If the soldier had to enter a PIN each day, for instance (a kind of dead man's switch), and assuming the enemy is abiding by the rules of war and thus can't compel a captured soldier to reveal it, there is absolutely nothing the enemy could do to prevent being locked out of the encryption after obtaining a radio. I'm aware of the constraints inherent in designing equipment for this kind of demanding physical environment, but with reprogrammable chips being the norm rather than the exception, I'm really surprised that more modern cryptography isn't expected from these radios.

krisoft 3y ago
> I'm really surprised that more modern cryptography isn't expected from these radios Military radios absolutely do have modern cryptography. That is half the reason why the NSA exists. If you think you know better most likely you are wrong, or you are seeing some system which is held back so they can maintain compatibility with coalition forces. You don’t need revocation certificates to zero out the key material of a radio. In fact it wouldn’t work reliably because it assumes all network participants are within radio range and listening when you want to zero your keys. Much more easy and reliable is to delete the key material localy on the radio. This zeroing can be also performed by a remote signal.