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Because zero people are dead from this issue, it’s relatively easy to inspect for, and isn’t a design problem- unlike the max problems?
by lazide 3y ago
Because zero people are dead from this issue, it’s relatively easy to inspect for, and isn’t a design problem- unlike the max problems?
- TylerE 3y agoOnly due to a bloody miracle. If people had been in the two nearest seats they were getting sucked straight out. That those seats were coincidentally empty doesn't lessen the seriousness of the event.
- lazide 3y agoI mean, it literally does? If 2 people has died, it would have been a more serious event. By definition, no?
- dylan604 3y agoNo. It was a serious event even without casualties. If people had died, it would have been tragic, fatal, or any other adjective. If it wasn't serious, we wouldn't still be discussing it.
- lupusreal 3y agoYours is exactly the kind of attitude that gets people killed in workplaces. I slip on a puddle, but I'm young and nimble so I catch myself. No harm done to me, not a serious incident right? I don't report the puddle. Then another guy comes alone, he's older, his reflexes aren't so good. He bounces his head off the concrete and dies. This is why all workplace safety policies tell you to treat near misses like the real thing. The only difference between them is circumstantial luck.
- westhanover 3y agoThat person is a psychopath. The only good thing is that in a competent safety focused org someone like him would be fired instantly.
- lazide 3y agoBeautiful. And what exactly led you to that insightful psychoanalysis? Especially since I’m not saying it isn’t serious. Just pointing out that 0 < 2 < 189. Which is quite literally true, is it not?
- dylan604 3y agoany number > 0 when counting deaths because of a company's malfeasance, incompetence, or any other word to describe it is serious. since you seem to like superlatives, any number > 0 is the most serious thing. your product killed 1 person in a failure or 189 in a failure is no less damning. even if your product's failure nearly killed some number > 0 is a serious thing.
- lazide 3y agoSo now you’re saying it wasn’t serious because there was no one killed? I’m very confused here. I thought it was serious, just less serious than those that actually killed people, because it does show system issues at Boeing related to actually doing safe changes to their planes. Which is a scary operational problem, but at least not a major plane design problem. Which will kill someone (or a lot of someones!) eventually. And got called a psychopath for it, apparently? Which doesn’t seem very polite.
- dylan604 3y ago> So now you’re saying it wasn’t serious because there was no one killed? I’m very confused here. Yes, you've been very confused in this entire thread. No, I did not say what you think I've said. In fact, I stated the exact opposite. You seem to have an agenda and are attempting to read that into this entire thread.
- dylan604 3y ago> unlike the max problems? what do you mean unlike the MAX problems? do you think this is a different model aircraft. The MCAS related crashes with 300+ casualties was an earlier version of the MAX. The door flying off was still a MAX. So at this point, we should be well past viewing incidents on a per incident basis, and now just see each one as yet another example of the failure/lack of Boeing's prowess on designing a safe airplane.
- lazide 3y agoMCAS was a design problem, and one inherent from the start. That the FAA (kinda, due to the weird industry setup) approved. This was an ops problem. The common element is Boeing, not the model of plane.
- dylan604 3y agoIf you really want to separate them out like that, but that seems pointless. The rot within Boeing seems to have culminated with the fiasco that is the MAX. It was executive decisions and the example that showed for the middle management to follow that allowed all of the issues to happen. Whether it was the lackadaisical nature of how many bolts were installed to the cover up/conspiracy of trying to hide the flight characteristics with MCAS to avoid re-certifying pilots, it's all stems from the same rot
- TylerE 3y agoThe common elements are Boeing and the model of the plane.
- lazide 3y agoThe model of the plane is what they are currently producing at scale. What do you want to bet if that changed (and on other models) they have similar problems with those too? Notably, this type of ops issue (managers pushing for high velocity - paperwork and quality of work be damned) is inevitable when output numbers must go up or stay the same even in the face of other pressures increasing. We’ve all been there for sure - too many bugs coming in, so mark them ‘can’t reproduce’ the first pass through, or if we can’t figure out what is going on in the first couple minutes. Or put a hack into production to fix it now, with an actual real fix ‘on the backlog’ indefinitely. Or playing whack a mole with problems instead of investigating root causes. It’s a burnout/realism problem. Very tempting in ops/QA for the business - and then when something breaks, or a customer gets angry because they’re getting blown off, blame the engineer/tech/QA person and fire them instead of fix the actual cause, which is unrealistic workloads, or bad process, or management prioritization failures, etc.
- deleted 3y ago[deleted]