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SaaS: gmail, vpn providers, ebay. IaaS: running your own email server, your own cloud, your own vpn. I'm vehemently against the idea of a KYC for iaas. This
by nimbius 3y ago
SaaS: gmail, vpn providers, ebay.
IaaS: running your own email server, your own cloud, your own vpn.
I'm vehemently against the idea of a KYC for iaas. This just feels like another swipe at destroying internet anonymity. "Foreign actors" already route traffic over every network in the US. Preventing them from getting an ec2 isnt necessary as senators can already request aws drop customers because they dont like them (joe lieberman personally pulled the plug on wikileaks)
- forgetfreeman 3y agoInternet anonymity was destroyed decades ago. That horse is not going back into the barn.
- int_19h 3y agoAll the more reason to fight tooth and nail for whatever scraps we still have left.
- which 3y agoNot really. With Tor, Protonmail, njal.la, Flokinet (or one of a hundred other competitors), and $100 in Bitcoin from an ATM that you convert to Monero, you have enough to host a website and domain that are completely disassociated from your real life identity for a year.
- lostemptations5 3y agoSo easy!
- which 3y agoI wouldn't say easy but things are definitely easier now that it is possible to pay for things anonymously without having to use things like Liberty Reserve. On the other hand less of the web is usable now without Javascript and tracking than before.
- forgetfreeman 3y agoThink so? Want to review the number of times individuals who made their living off being "anonymous" online got de-anonymized by security consultants, ad agencies, pissed off gamers, or law enforcement agencies? If you really thought your opsec was that good you'd be laundering money for a cartel.
- deleted 3y ago[deleted]
- silverliver 3y agoI do. Please mention the top instances you know where people were caught because they did what GP described. I'll wait. People get deanonymized in spite of using Tor and Monero, not because of it.
- which 3y agoKrebs investigations' overwhelmingly rely on reused emails and phone numbers across services which he follows back to some account they registered in 2008 in their real name. This is very effective because he is investigating cybercriminals who 1) have been at it for a while and have left extensive trails and 2) don't really care that much if they are identified because they can just stay in Russia. In the Alphabay and Silk Road cases, they relied on similar techniques (AlphaBay welcome emails sent from Cazes's hotmail, "altoid"/Bitcointalk/Shroomery posts in the case of Silk Road). These kind of things can be prevented by making a new email with a service that doesn't require your phone number and your real name. In the recent Monopoly Market case and seizures from the huge hacks, it was all chain analysis. Only the Bitfinex hackers even tried to conceal what they were doing (by using Alphabay as a mixer, which became their undoing once it was seized), the others went straight from crime -> accounts in their name. This can be obviated with Monero. Yes, I'm aware that the US government used some sort of probabilistic attack on Monero in 2018 against North Korea, which has since been fixed. I don't want to spend my whole life looking over my shoulder and IRL opsec is a whole other thing that I am not really familiar with. I don't use the techniques in my post because I'm not leading a double life or something like that, but I think it's entertaining to read about. Edit: Also, is your contention that there is no Internet anonymity anymore, therefore it's fine to even further limit Internet anonymity?