2 ms·

But based on the post, this really seems to not be the case? "Price deviations don’t immunize conspirators. Some things in life might require perfection, but p

But based on the post, this really seems to not be the case? "Price deviations don’t immunize conspirators. Some things in life might require perfection, but price-fixing arrangements aren’t one of them. Just because a software recommends rather than determines a price doesn’t mean it’s legal. Setting initial starting prices or recommending initial starting prices can be illegal, even if conspirators deviate from recommended prices." Would be better to see an argument from the FTC grounded in evidence and analysis, because I don't get what this is based on. Software recommends a price, sure, but so does any appraisal in any industry. For how long can I use an appraisal service before the FTC says I'm committing a crime? I just feel like the lines are not drawn very clearly with this argument. Aside, if anyone from the FTC is here right now, for God's sake do not use "IRL" in official writing.

rahimnathwani 3y ago
But based on the post, this really seems to not be the case? I don't understand how you came to that conclusion. From the post: an agreement to use shared pricing recommendations, lists, calculations, or algorithms can still be unlawful even where co-conspirators retain some pricing discretion or cheat on the agreement. Also from the post: The agencies filed a joint legal brief explaining... From that legal brief (emphasis mine): ... when competitors *agree to fix* end prices, ... *the agreement* is the violation, and unsuccessful price-fixing schemes are as unlawful as successful ones. Another commenter asked how this is different from car dealers using the KBB values. If a deal uses KBB values to inform themselves of the approximate value of a car, before deciding their opening bid/offer in a negotiation, that's fine. If they agree with a neighbouring dealer that they'll always start their negotiation with the KBB price, this is illegal price fixing. From the brief: In Plymouth Dealers’ Association, 279 F.2d 128, for instance, a defendant convicted of price fixing for agreeing with competing dealers on a “fixed uniform list price” for Plymouth cars argued that the conviction could not be upheld because the government’s case required “proof of something more—that [the uniform list price] was adhered to; that it was utilized to fix prices; or that it did actually fix prices.” Id. at 130. The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, stating that “the fact that the dealers used the fixed uniform list price in most instances only as a starting point[] is of no consequence.” Pages 23-24 (PageID #6982 and PageID #6983) of the PDF explain how the collusion was orchestrated: https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/YardiSOI-filed%28withattachments%29_0.pdf https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/YardiSOI-filed%...

rahimnathwani 3y ago

But based on the post, this really seems to not be the case? I don't understand how you came to that conclusion. From the post: an agreement to use shared pricing recommendations, lists, calculations, or algorithms can still be unlawful even where co-conspirators retain some pricing discretion or cheat on the agreement. Also from the post: The agencies filed a joint legal brief explaining... From that legal brief (emphasis mine): ... when competitors *agree to fix* end prices, ... *the agreement* is the violation, and unsuccessful price-fixing schemes are as unlawful as successful ones. Another commenter asked how this is different from car dealers using the KBB values. If a deal uses KBB values to inform themselves of the approximate value of a car, before deciding their opening bid/offer in a negotiation, that's fine. If they agree with a neighbouring dealer that they'll always start their negotiation with the KBB price, this is illegal price fixing. From the brief: In Plymouth Dealers’ Association, 279 F.2d 128, for instance, a defendant convicted of price fixing for agreeing with competing dealers on a “fixed uniform list price” for Plymouth cars argued that the conviction could not be upheld because the government’s case required “proof of something more—that [the uniform list price] was adhered to; that it was utilized to fix prices; or that it did actually fix prices.” Id. at 130. The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, stating that “the fact that the dealers used the fixed uniform list price in most instances only as a starting point[] is of no consequence.” Pages 23-24 (PageID #6982 and PageID #6983) of the PDF explain how the collusion was orchestrated: https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/YardiSOI-filed%28withattachments%29_0.pdf https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/YardiSOI-filed%...