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Actually I'd rather have such "bonkers" tests than the other extreme, like NASA not thinking about what could happen if pieces of foam from the external fuel ta
by rob74 3y ago
Actually I'd rather have such "bonkers" tests than the other extreme, like NASA not thinking about what could happen if pieces of foam from the external fuel tank impacted the Space Shuttle on launch until it was too late (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_Shuttle_Columbia_disaster https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_Shuttle_Columbia_disaste...).
- ortusdux 3y agoOr not thinking that an O-ring might experience temperatures below freezing in Florida https://priceonomics.com/the-space-shuttle-challenger-explosion-and-the-o/ https://priceonomics.com/the-space-shuttle-challenger-explos...
- lupusreal 3y agoThe really shitty thing is they knew early on the O-rings were slipping and partially extruding themselves, which wasn't part of the original design. They shrugged and ignored this, which then opened the door for disaster when the O-rings behaved differently (and still wrong) when cold. If they had pumped the brakes when the initial deviation from the design was discovered, it wouldn't have ended in disaster.
- b112 3y agoMy memory saya that some engineers objected, but they were ignored.
- rjmunro 3y agoEngineers objected and were ignored for the foam strike as well. What I don't know is how many engineers object, are ignored, and everything goes fine anyway. Maybe these are the only 2 times engineers objected. Maybe they get 100 objections for every launch.
- ortusdux 3y agohttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roger_Boisjoly#O-ring_safety_concerns https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roger_Boisjoly#O-ring_safety_c... "Boisjoly wrote a memo in July 1985 to his superiors concerning the faulty design of the solid rocket boosters that, if left unaddressed, could lead to a catastrophic event during launch of a Space Shuttle. Such a catastrophic event occurred six months later resulting in the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster."
- jasonwatkinspdx 3y agoThat one is a classic example of normalization of deviance. They knew there were temperature limits, but they'd pushed the boundary a bit in the past with no ill results, and so began to feel complacent about the risks of pushing them even further.
- nordsieck 3y agoThe sad part about this issue is that this was an ongoing problem. NASA 100% knew about; they just ... didn't address it. Here's an account of just one such incident: https://spaceflightnow.com/shuttle/sts119/090327sts27/ https://spaceflightnow.com/shuttle/sts119/090327sts27/