[Link to an academic analysis from April 2022] Very problematic it is to suggest that the above analysis (being limited enough in its own scope) has much, if a

[Link to an academic analysis from April 2022] Very problematic it is to suggest that the above analysis (being limited enough in its own scope) has much, if any, extrapolation to the situation now 2 years later -- when so many things have changed (in some aspects quite categorically) in the interim, on both sides. For starters: no, you don't just grab a 37-day window at the start of the conflict when one party temporarily enjoyed the initiative and achieved a partial breakthrough; wave a measuring stick around various places at the map, and guesstimate a "velocity"; then conclude their this their intrinsic, operational "velocity", and hence will surely kick in again at some point. Simply put, this is just now how wars work. Russia seems to be steadily and rapidly taking territory Russia has made some notable gains in recent months, on top of Ukraine's vastly larger rebound across the previous year-plus. But there is no way you can call Russia's recent gains "rapid" by the standards of the current (full-scale) phase of the conflict. They've taken months to achieve, and at very heavy cost. Including the total obliteration of most of those areas now deemed to be suitably cleansed and purified -- and now finally fit and ready for their glorious re-admission to the Russian World.