Interesting links in the article and comments, but it seems like two different concepts are mixed here – the nature of bureaucracies and wrong incentives. I str

Interesting links in the article and comments, but it seems like two different concepts are mixed here – the nature of bureaucracies and wrong incentives. I struggle to understand how cobra and rat cases are "institutions trying to preserve the problem". Cobra effect, in particular, is an immensely interesting topic of how rewarding the metrics can distort the system, otherwise known as Goodhart's effect. I highly recommend reading these two papers on the subject for anyone interested: - Categorizing Variants of Goodhart's Law [1] - Building less-flawed metrics: Understanding and creating better measurement and incentive systems [2] Adding the "Cognitive Surplus" book to the to-do shelf, but it seems like Shirky principle is mostly about institutions and the nature of bureaucracies. Now, a good question would be - when and why Shirky principle does not apply to the institutions. My first thought is the difference between bureaucracies that have "owner" and ones who lost it. When a bureaucracy has an owner (person or group of people) who can change the bureaucracy in response to external events, then it's probably unlikely to have Shirky effect (WHO and smallpox example in comments). However, bureaucracies that have lost their owner will most likely have this effect. The best thing I read on this subject (how bureaucracies work) is Samo Burja's "Great Founder Theory" [3]. If anyone can suggest something along these lines on the fundamental principles of bureaucracies, I would appreciate a lot. [1] https://arxiv.org/abs/1803.04585 https://arxiv.org/abs/1803.04585 [2] https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2666389923002210 https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S266638992... [3] https://samoburja.com/gft/ https://samoburja.com/gft/