3 ms·
I was reading the NIST comments and djb is not very happy with how they present things, and the other commenters seem to think he is a prick.
by bjoli 3y ago
I was reading the NIST comments and djb is not very happy with how they present things, and the other commenters seem to think he is a prick.
- londons_explore 3y agoI want an encryption algorithm composed of 2 parts chained, such that both parts need to be broken for the whole thing to be broken. And I'd like the US/The west to declare 1 part as secure, and I'd like Russia to declare the other part as secure. I'm fairly confident that Russia and the US won't collude to push a known-weak algorithm.
- snowwrestler 3y agoThey would not have to collude; there is no incentive for either to publicly endorse a secure algorithm. Both Russian and U.S. intelligence services want the ability to break into anything. They would publicly endorse insecure algorithms, and then employ more secure algorithms in their own classified systems. I think encryption quality is best evaluated by math and technical testing, not international political triangulation.
- dlubarov 3y agoAlternatively we could use hash-based signature schemes which have been proven secure under certain assumptions about hash functions, such as SPHINCS, or ZKP based schemes along the lines of Picnic (Picnic in particular uses LowMC which is somewhat new). In that case a backup seems unnecessary.