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>Sure, populist shows of retribution weren't prioritised. Keep in mind the time frames within which TARP was passed. I don't think anyone is asking for populis
by no_wizard 3y ago
>Sure, populist shows of retribution weren't prioritised. Keep in mind the time frames within which TARP was passed.
I don't think anyone is asking for populist retribution[0]. I'm asking for fraud, gross negligence, financial impropriety and a host of other actual things that happened to be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law, and that would mean going after executives and boardrooms, where the decisions were made. Even by this point fining corporations is a slap on the wrist. Culpability is with the decision makers. That means executives and boardrooms.
Conversely, upon further review, it also means at least a few dozen regulators needed to be removed from their posts and investigations should have been opened into those failures too, to a much broader extent than they were.
>Based on what law did you want these binding legal agreements invalidated?
They should have made it a condition of accepting the TARP funds. I'm not surprised it wasn't (though I'm getting conflicting information when I go to look this up, there appears to be an optional provision that allowed the government to elect to do so, but its unclear if it made it into the final bill), but its plain silly that we attached no real sticks to this. In fact, it was proposed at the time[1], that much is certain.
>Not true. The Fed and FDIC's powers were expanded thoroughly post crisis.
Their roles perhaps, and we could discuss that, but it isn't what I posited. The real question I have is: What meaningful reform happened? There has already been rollbacks of the Dodd-Frank bill in the intervening years[3] and I'm unaware of any regulatory teeth over the derivatives market, for example.
Whether the FDIC and The Fed have expanded regulatory scope isn't the same thing as passing meaningful reforms.
>It remains unsettled whether breaking up the big banks is the right move for stability. America continues to have a large number of banks per capita relative to other countries.
I will contend that splitting banks up where "main street" banks (traditional loans, checking, savings and other things traditionally associated with mainstream consumer banking) and investment banking should be split. There's no reason the holder of my deposits should also be actively exposing the core safety of the institution by making speculative investments in the derivatives market, for example. Separating concerns is how it used to be, and the only outgrowth of the M&A of the 80s and 90s in the banking sector seems to only be new ways to create riskier investment portfolios. I don't think having these very disparate activities under the same business is a good thing, as you risk the institutions stability, as we saw in 2008, and again, to a lesser extent last year.
Boring banks are good banks. Note however I'm not saying those risky financial opportunities are in and of themselves bad. They aren't, per se, but they should be a separate business entity entirely, and not allowed to cross-pollinate each other to the extent that they do today, if at all.
>What happened in '08 was outside the FDIC's purview. That was the problem. Depositors weren't running, it was the other parts of the system that failed.
I said as much.
EDIT: I initially posited that the FDIC had similar authority prior to the events of 2008-2013. I incorrectly conflated the role of the Resolution Trust Corporation and the FDIC having management over that with the FDIC itself having authority to take a bank into receivership and to seek to sell its assets in-part or in-full, to make depositors whole. That's my memory failing me. I retract this assertion. This is indeed a post 2008 role it has assumed.
[0]: To me "populist shows of retribution" is more guillotine justice than simply enforcing the rule of law, and I think its intentionally combative. All anyone is really asking for here, as upset as I maybe regarding what happened in 2008[2], I'm only asking that we actually prosecute those responsible for the myriad of financial improprieties that took place. I don't know why this is controversial. To re-iterate, I have stated I want to see those culpable stand trial to the fullest extent of the law.
[1]: https://www.businessinsider.com/senate-can-claw-back-any-2008-tarp-bonus-over-100000-2009-2 https://www.businessinsider.com/senate-can-claw-back-any-200...
[2]: To which I admit, I'm a bit combative over. Look at this way; We know the players, we know the causes, and we even know down to the groups of people who the actors were that were major influences on why things went the way they did, and they all get to walk away, head high? I'm saying that we know what crimes took place and even who committed them, and no case was ever opened, let alone prosecuted. In what other sector could crime happen at this scale, and we know the players, the whens, the hows, and we don't prosecute?
[3]: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/22/business/congress-passes-dodd-frank-rollback-for-smaller-banks.html https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/22/business/congress-passes-...
- JumpCrisscross 3y ago> What meaningful reform happened? There has already been rollbacks of the Dodd-Frank bill in the intervening years[3] and I'm unaware of any regulatory teeth over the derivatives market, for example. Most derivatives are now centrally cleared, which means centrally reported. SIFIs are held to tight stress testing and reporting standards. Banks have to maintain failure plans. That's just off the top of my head. All of these components allowed First Republic, SVB and Signature to fail in a way they could not have pre-2008. > the FDIC has always had this power, and it was well exercised in the S&L crash and its aftermath between 1987-1994 No, it did not. No competent banking lawyer would allege as much. And the S&L crisis famously involved depositors losing money because the FDIC was hamstrung [1]. The FDIC did not have the power to bail out e.g. AIG in 2008. > Boring banks are good banks I strongly recommend an introductory money and banking text [2]. Each of First Republic, SVB and Signature failed due to boring banking mechanisms. [1] https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/167_188.pdf https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/167_188.pdf [2] https://www.amazon.com/dp/0134733827?ref_=cm_sw_r_apin_dp_NCRYQT8Y2ZJRJ94E54XP&language=en-US https://www.amazon.com/dp/0134733827?ref_=cm_sw_r_apin_dp_NC...
- no_wizard 3y ago>Most derivatives are now centrally cleared, which means centrally reported. SIFIs are held to tight stress testing and reporting standards. Banks have to maintain failure plans. That's just off the top of my head. Which is a lower pool of banks, because of rollbacks to Dodd-Frank, which designate a much smaller class of banks as SIFI. In fact, the Federal Reserve pointed the finger at these rollbacks as an important piece of how SVB managed to fail in the first place[0][1] If I understand correctly, being exempted of the SIFI status in practice means that regulators are much more lax in stress testing and enforcement of the tighter Dodd-Frank provisions. When you say failure plans, we are really talking about reserves, there has always been some reserve / loss requirements, they were tighter until the de-regulation of the 80s and 90s, IIRC, and the only thing that has happened there is that some of that same tightness in regulation was restored, but its not net new in the sense that it pushed broader regulation, it only restored some aspects that were actually already in place at prior to the aforementioned de-regulation, IIRC >Most derivatives are now centrally cleared, which means centrally reported I'm unsure if this is meaningful or not, particularly since the conditions that caused LTCM to fail (and really drove much of the 2008 failings) still exist[3] >No, it did not. No competent banking lawyer would allege as much. And you're right. I conflated the role of the Resolution Trust Corporation and the FDIC (at some point, the FDIC was in charge of the RTC I think) which played a similar enough role in my memory that I ended up conflated here. I edited the post to reflect my errors. I should revisit this time period at a later date. > Each of First Republic, SVB and Signature failed due to boring banking mechanisms. That isn't really consensus of multiple agencies. They were negligent in managing their risk[1][2] I don't think that's "boring bank" activity, to be repeatedly mismanaging risks. Unless textbook case of mismanagement by the bank[2] is a boring bank activity. [0]: https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/us-fed-points-finger-trump-era-rollback-svb-demise-2023-04-29/ https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/us-fed-points-finge... [1]: https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/the-regulatory-breakdown-behind-the-collapse-of-silicon-valley-bank https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/the-regulatory-breakd... [2]: https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/svb-review-20230428.pdf https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/svb-review... [3]: In my research, Warren Buffett of all folks maintains these risk are alive and well, "a ticking time bomb that will serve to poison markets", to paraphrase. I'm unsure what to make of it (Buffett by his own admission isn't the foremost authority on economics, though its hard to dismiss the guy given the track record) but it is interesting never the less.