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This subject was already discussed here 2 days ago (819 points, 778 comments) [1] and the top comment highlighted that Apple gives its reasoning in a way that i
by crazygringo 3y ago
This subject was already discussed here 2 days ago (819 points, 778 comments) [1] and the top comment highlighted that Apple gives its reasoning in a way that is at least worth considering. From Apple [2]:
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The iOS system has traditionally provided support for Home Screen web apps by building directly on WebKit and its security architecture. That integration means Home Screen web apps are managed to align with the security and privacy model for native apps on iOS, including isolation of storage and enforcement of system prompts to access privacy impacting capabilities on a per-site basis.
Without this type of isolation and enforcement, malicious web apps could read data from other web apps and recapture their permissions to gain access to a user’s camera, microphone or location without a user’s consent. Browsers also could install web apps on the system without a user’s awareness and consent. Addressing the complex security and privacy concerns associated with web apps using alternative browser engines would require building an entirely new integration architecture that does not currently exist in iOS and was not practical to undertake given the other demands of the DMA and the very low user adoption of Home Screen web apps. And so, to comply with the DMA’s requirements, we had to remove the Home Screen web apps feature in the EU.
EU users will be able to continue accessing websites directly from their Home Screen through a bookmark with minimal impact to their functionality. We expect this change to affect a small number of users. Still, we regret any impact this change — that was made as part of the work to comply with the DMA — may have on developers of Home Screen web apps and our users.
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There were 451 comments responding just to that [3].
[1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=39388218 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=39388218
[2] https://developer.apple.com/support/dma-and-apps-in-the-eu/#dev-qa https://developer.apple.com/support/dma-and-apps-in-the-eu/#...
[3] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=39388652 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=39388652
- appplication 3y ago> Without this type of isolation and enforcement, malicious web apps could read data from other web apps and recapture their permissions to gain access to a user’s camera, microphone or location without a user’s consent. Browsers also could install web apps on the system without a user’s awareness and consent. I’m not sure I fully understand the ire at Apple here. If any of this is true, killing PWAs sounds like the right move. Everyone who is pissed off at Apple is just fine with this? The fact that this can all happen without user consent completely throws away any arguments of “I’m a responsible user who should be able to choose what apps run in my phone, not some big company”. Because if you really believe that, then you would also not want apps like this to exist under the new EU rules. I’ll be honest I just don’t get it.
- ruszki 3y ago> [it] would require building an entirely new integration architecture that does not currently exist in iOS and was not practical to undertake given the other demands of the DMA and the very low user adoption of Home Screen web apps So it can be done, DMA doesn’t require this, even according to Apple.
- szasamasa 3y agoin a hypothetical spy browser maybe :) not in any of the modern browser engines like Gecko/Firefox just be responsible and use Safari if you want the status quo or use a trusted browser engine like from a big company like Firefox/Edge/Chrome do not be fooled, you people use web capabilities including service workers on websites in all OS, you even did it with Safari on iOS if iOS had some vulnerability vs. android, windows, linux, mac that made this possible in other browser engines than webkit then Apple has to make the changes you really think it is an effort if every other OS does this, including macOS? and if with more information you see Apple tried something fishy here, do not forget like most LLMs most of the prompts in the past... never trust Apple again in this regard! but you can use other browser engines in macOS (where no app store revenue originates) and Apple never had a problem implementing it and never fear mongered... this should be some kind of implicit proof but of course Apple will have to prove this and they will fail to do so... they are just pushing the boundaries
- crazygringo 3y ago> in a hypothetical spy browser maybe :) not in any of the modern browser engines like Gecko/Firefox But that's the whole point of security -- you're protecting precisely against the disguised malware, not the well-behaved software. To say that this isn't necessary because there exist browsers that are well-behaved misses the point of security entirely. And remember that iOS was built with a new model of security in mind from the start. They don't want their security guarantees becoming undone because suddenly third-party browsers can start installing things on the home screen that look like familiar apps and inherit all sorts of permissions.
- 3y ago
- szasamasa 3y agodma here: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32022R1925&from=EN https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELE... Apple cannot simply invoke DMA (50) as a free pass. For its arguments to align with the intent of the legislation, here's a roadmap of what they need to do to justify their security-based restrictions on iOS: Apple must be transparent about the exact security issues posed by alternative browser engines with concrete instances (not merely speculative risks). They need to prove that these are unique to iOS, given the successful use of unrestricted browser engines on macOS (and every other OS). Before opting for the extreme step of removing functionality, Apple needs to offer documentation of all the methods for managing and mitigating specific threats that were considered and subsequently ruled out as infeasible (sandboxing, enhanced APIs, etc.). This emphasizes that their actions are indeed the last resort and not merely a way to suppress competition. The company needs to demonstrate how they would proactively work with browser engine developers to establish strong security controls and threat monitoring on par with or exceeding their current practices for native-only experiences. This shifts the focus to building a safe environment rather than merely limiting the scope of capabilities. Apple must guarantee that if and when these security challenges are met, it will progressively expand support for unrestricted use of web standards for third-party browser engines. This creates the long-term perspective the DMA is designed to protect and gives confidence to developers investing in advanced web app solutions. Without taking action in these key areas, Apple's reliance on this DMA portion won't hold up to regulatory scrutiny. They cannot cite generic security dangers then fall back on "practicality" arguments without robust, evidence-backed reasoning.