Most of the time, when someone trying to show logical inconsistencies (and this is only my observation), they either a) don't understand what the argument is ab

Most of the time, when someone trying to show logical inconsistencies (and this is only my observation), they either a) don't understand what the argument is about, and try to apply "logical" conditions to the discussion, or b) they are talking about the phenomenological world of programming and the compiler won't run. That second example should really, I think, demonstrate how silly the first case is. Because just as in programming, our arguments in the rest of the world always follow a certain contextual logic and order that can't be extracted from its social and material history; often, putting that history into question requires defying that logic, and whatever defies logic is oftentimes only intelligible within that logic as unintelligible, as "baloney," "fallacious." Its just as they say, the Shaiva Monists, that nobody ever has a false perception of reality--or rather, false perceptions are always already at some level true perceptions of the world, the only false perception is to think there are any. In order for people to "make mistakes," you'd have to accept that the "mistake" itself was not already part of the process of the truth unfolding.