To the extent that the physical world and consciousness can be modeled as computations (in order to “simulate” on some hardware), the details of the “hardware”

To the extent that the physical world and consciousness can be modeled as computations (in order to “simulate” on some hardware), the details of the “hardware” running the simulation are totally irrelevant to the occupants of the simulation; only the relational patterns between states of the simulation at different times are relevant. The hardware could run fast or slow; forwards or backwards in “simulation time”; once or multiple times over and over; using grungy calculations or clock time-saving efficient algorithms. Actually, it’s irrelevant to the occupants of the simulation whether or not the simulation is even “run” or merely has the potential to run. Or, indeed, whether the hardware even exists. Or, indeed, whether we use the word “simulation” instead of “laws of physics” to describe the patterns of relations between simulation states. It’s hard for me to see how the simulation hypothesis can have any content whatsoever.