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>IMO people behind the scenes also sees the writing on the wall for large surface ships. Considering this and Taiwan, it's funny that Congress isn't pushing fo

>IMO people behind the scenes also sees the writing on the wall for large surface ships. Considering this and Taiwan, it's funny that Congress isn't pushing for more SSGNs and accelerating the SSN(X) program.

maxglute 3y ago
IMO when seriously consider the math, the firepower:acquisition cost ratio doesn't make much sense, especially against PRC. SSGN with ~150 tomahawks, subsonic, easier to intercept, will likely never be reloadable at sea, and may not be able to operate permissively around PRC in due time. PRC ASW is improving rapidly, and they're deploying subsea ASW infra within 1st island chain. Not much info on projected upgrade of hypersonics to subsurface flee, but if extrapolate from zumwalt hypersonic projections current 80 cells for TLAM (tomahawks) whittles down to 12 CGHBs (common hypersonic glide bodies), that's ~20 more lethal CGHBs on subs and combined with multi week roundtrip to reload and get back into theatre, it's essentially nothing. For reference it's estimated taking out PRC SCS island bases will require 400-500 tomahawks, and that may only temporarily disable runways. Even if US can take out entire PLANavy, PRC can sustain massive war effort from mainland aviation/rocketry, the latter could feasibly hit CONUS. I think that's whats ultimately driving procurement decisions, trying to deliver the most survivable firepower which a lot of these larger projects are subpar at (again relative to PRC) if war ever escalates to homeland strikes. Hence Navy Force Design focusing on expanding with smaller unmanned ships / distributed lethality model (which will include lots of unmanned subsurface). In the meantime, large, expensive, eggs in a basket platforms that are difficult to crew, impossible to replace during war, that's been in pipeline for a long time and are being pursued to institutional inertia, because brass doesn't want to kill their baby. VS 100+ B21s with less labour and per unit cost that can deliver around the clock, probably difficult to shoot down unless they're parked in hardened hanger or their midair tanking (if needed) gets degraded, but losing one is a couple pilots and 1/10th the cost.
- mikewarot 3y ago
  Which is why, if we decide we need to take out China, we'll sail over to the coast off Yemen, and stop any oil headed their way. They'll collapse within 6 months. (Or so sayeth Peter Zeihan)
  - Tostino 3y ago
    When I see statements like this, I try to think "what would they do in response that would change the calculus?" E.g. cutting off oil...not like that has ever led to unexpected outcomes (perl harbor). Countries generally react to mitigate your actions. What are some of the potential reactions you could see if the PRC perceived that as an existential threat?
    - Sabinus 3y ago
      Belt and Road, String of Pearls, massive build-out of anti ship missiles and navy. And it's not enough, at least for the next ~decade. The ocean supply route is to large and too strung out for a navy lesser than the USN to defend.
  - JohnBooty 3y ago
    He always seems to have such a strong handle on things, but I have absolutely zero idea whether or not he's completely full of crap.
  - maxglute 3y ago
    Incoming Zeihan rant: That was fine strategy 10 years ago when he wrote Accidental Superpower / pre PLA modernization. This is the part where we circle back to developing PRC conventional hypersonics and potential to overwhelm US missile defense, and PRC increasingly able to strike CONUS at scale from mainland - PRC's version of prompt (conventional) global strike which they've been telegraphing development for years. A threat vector US planners are slowly acknowledging. Which means PRC can proportionally deny US energy by hitting critical infra like oil/LNG refineries, huge stationary targets with simple kill chain. Fortress America + shale autarky doesn't mean anything if you can't protect energy security (and by connection of fossil industrial inputs, food security), which is PRC's reverse UNO for the the entire blockading PRC oil strategy, except when applied to US, straight to extraction chain because can't blockade US from US. So next best proportional (even if escalatory thing) is just to make US as vunerable as PRC. All the resources in US sovereign soil is no good if they can't be extracted and made useful to sustain US hegemony. Saudi equipped US hardware learned that lesson when Houthis hit their refineries. Sure Us isn't incompetent like Saudi, but PRC isn't Houthis either, unless you think they actually replaced rocket fuel with water, and used said fuel for hotpot. Zeihan of skips over the politics in geoPOLITICS when convenient, i.e. US has most waterways, but PRC actually engineered significantly more and uses more internal waterways. US has deep coasts, but PRC dredged her to make way for half of worlds top 10 ports, the other half doesn't contain US. PRC has bad demographics, except PRC has the ideal demographics for geopolitical competition in the timelines relevant to us - set to produce and coordinate more high skilled talent in next 30 years (the cohorts that actually build national power) than US is projected increase population from all sources total, AND declining population of non productive peoples (old, unskilled, unproductive) aka less import dependencies. Declining cohort also has high home ownership and savings rate because frankly they don't expect big welfare net like west. Next 30 years, PRC swapping 50 million STEM talent (already born) with tier1 city earning potential for 100m farmers, migrant workers etc (old -> uneducated die first) that earn 1/10 that. IMO PRC demographic trend (if scrutinized beyond naive pyramid reading) is more pros than cons, especially considering PRC geographic/resource constraint - they don't need 3x more people than the US where only 1x can marginally compete with US and 2x are excess mouths to feed. Better off long term with 2x US population that PRC soil can sustain, where 1.5x can out compete US. Eitherway the point is frequently politics in geopolitics matter more. Fortress America has always been part geographic fortress and part artificial, technologic fortress. The entire reason US built/maintains the largest high tech expeditionary military is basically to stay on the front doors of any potential adversaries so they can't get close to CONUS. Let's not forget Continental Navy couldn't hold against out British blockade during revolutionary war without French Navy entering picture. CONUS was vunerable with 1800s tech, it's the technology (politics) part that made fortress america and it's the technology (military) that ensure two oceans are moats. High end missiles circumvents that, hence US unlikely to take out PRC without PRC taking out US unless US engages PRC directly. That's without considering PRC can drag US to fight near PRC home court by hitting JP/SKR/PH to trigger security obligation. Those are island with much worse self sufficiency that'll collapse in 2 months that US is treaty bound to defend. The TLDR is entire Malacca delima / SLOC blockade strategy operates on logic from 10 years ago when US can unilaterally fuck PRC at no _existential_ cost to herself (CONUS), once that logic breaks, blockade becomes unlikely / suicide pact. Question then is what will US/PRC commit suicide over.

maxglute 3y ago

IMO when seriously consider the math, the firepower:acquisition cost ratio doesn't make much sense, especially against PRC. SSGN with ~150 tomahawks, subsonic, easier to intercept, will likely never be reloadable at sea, and may not be able to operate permissively around PRC in due time. PRC ASW is improving rapidly, and they're deploying subsea ASW infra within 1st island chain. Not much info on projected upgrade of hypersonics to subsurface flee, but if extrapolate from zumwalt hypersonic projections current 80 cells for TLAM (tomahawks) whittles down to 12 CGHBs (common hypersonic glide bodies), that's ~20 more lethal CGHBs on subs and combined with multi week roundtrip to reload and get back into theatre, it's essentially nothing. For reference it's estimated taking out PRC SCS island bases will require 400-500 tomahawks, and that may only temporarily disable runways. Even if US can take out entire PLANavy, PRC can sustain massive war effort from mainland aviation/rocketry, the latter could feasibly hit CONUS. I think that's whats ultimately driving procurement decisions, trying to deliver the most survivable firepower which a lot of these larger projects are subpar at (again relative to PRC) if war ever escalates to homeland strikes. Hence Navy Force Design focusing on expanding with smaller unmanned ships / distributed lethality model (which will include lots of unmanned subsurface). In the meantime, large, expensive, eggs in a basket platforms that are difficult to crew, impossible to replace during war, that's been in pipeline for a long time and are being pursued to institutional inertia, because brass doesn't want to kill their baby. VS 100+ B21s with less labour and per unit cost that can deliver around the clock, probably difficult to shoot down unless they're parked in hardened hanger or their midair tanking (if needed) gets degraded, but losing one is a couple pilots and 1/10th the cost.

mikewarot 3y ago
Which is why, if we decide we need to take out China, we'll sail over to the coast off Yemen, and stop any oil headed their way. They'll collapse within 6 months. (Or so sayeth Peter Zeihan)
- Tostino 3y ago
  When I see statements like this, I try to think "what would they do in response that would change the calculus?" E.g. cutting off oil...not like that has ever led to unexpected outcomes (perl harbor). Countries generally react to mitigate your actions. What are some of the potential reactions you could see if the PRC perceived that as an existential threat?
  - Sabinus 3y ago
    Belt and Road, String of Pearls, massive build-out of anti ship missiles and navy. And it's not enough, at least for the next ~decade. The ocean supply route is to large and too strung out for a navy lesser than the USN to defend.
- JohnBooty 3y ago
  He always seems to have such a strong handle on things, but I have absolutely zero idea whether or not he's completely full of crap.
- maxglute 3y ago
  Incoming Zeihan rant: That was fine strategy 10 years ago when he wrote Accidental Superpower / pre PLA modernization. This is the part where we circle back to developing PRC conventional hypersonics and potential to overwhelm US missile defense, and PRC increasingly able to strike CONUS at scale from mainland - PRC's version of prompt (conventional) global strike which they've been telegraphing development for years. A threat vector US planners are slowly acknowledging. Which means PRC can proportionally deny US energy by hitting critical infra like oil/LNG refineries, huge stationary targets with simple kill chain. Fortress America + shale autarky doesn't mean anything if you can't protect energy security (and by connection of fossil industrial inputs, food security), which is PRC's reverse UNO for the the entire blockading PRC oil strategy, except when applied to US, straight to extraction chain because can't blockade US from US. So next best proportional (even if escalatory thing) is just to make US as vunerable as PRC. All the resources in US sovereign soil is no good if they can't be extracted and made useful to sustain US hegemony. Saudi equipped US hardware learned that lesson when Houthis hit their refineries. Sure Us isn't incompetent like Saudi, but PRC isn't Houthis either, unless you think they actually replaced rocket fuel with water, and used said fuel for hotpot. Zeihan of skips over the politics in geoPOLITICS when convenient, i.e. US has most waterways, but PRC actually engineered significantly more and uses more internal waterways. US has deep coasts, but PRC dredged her to make way for half of worlds top 10 ports, the other half doesn't contain US. PRC has bad demographics, except PRC has the ideal demographics for geopolitical competition in the timelines relevant to us - set to produce and coordinate more high skilled talent in next 30 years (the cohorts that actually build national power) than US is projected increase population from all sources total, AND declining population of non productive peoples (old, unskilled, unproductive) aka less import dependencies. Declining cohort also has high home ownership and savings rate because frankly they don't expect big welfare net like west. Next 30 years, PRC swapping 50 million STEM talent (already born) with tier1 city earning potential for 100m farmers, migrant workers etc (old -> uneducated die first) that earn 1/10 that. IMO PRC demographic trend (if scrutinized beyond naive pyramid reading) is more pros than cons, especially considering PRC geographic/resource constraint - they don't need 3x more people than the US where only 1x can marginally compete with US and 2x are excess mouths to feed. Better off long term with 2x US population that PRC soil can sustain, where 1.5x can out compete US. Eitherway the point is frequently politics in geopolitics matter more. Fortress America has always been part geographic fortress and part artificial, technologic fortress. The entire reason US built/maintains the largest high tech expeditionary military is basically to stay on the front doors of any potential adversaries so they can't get close to CONUS. Let's not forget Continental Navy couldn't hold against out British blockade during revolutionary war without French Navy entering picture. CONUS was vunerable with 1800s tech, it's the technology (politics) part that made fortress america and it's the technology (military) that ensure two oceans are moats. High end missiles circumvents that, hence US unlikely to take out PRC without PRC taking out US unless US engages PRC directly. That's without considering PRC can drag US to fight near PRC home court by hitting JP/SKR/PH to trigger security obligation. Those are island with much worse self sufficiency that'll collapse in 2 months that US is treaty bound to defend. The TLDR is entire Malacca delima / SLOC blockade strategy operates on logic from 10 years ago when US can unilaterally fuck PRC at no _existential_ cost to herself (CONUS), once that logic breaks, blockade becomes unlikely / suicide pact. Question then is what will US/PRC commit suicide over.