Sure, but the road to hell is paved with good intentions overwhelmed by the reality of incentive structures. This is like the venture capitalism version of "rea

Sure, but the road to hell is paved with good intentions overwhelmed by the reality of incentive structures. This is like the venture capitalism version of "real communism has never been tried". Both of these things are true: founders (and leaders of VC-funded businesses in general) have an incentive to focus on investment rounds and runway, and VCs have an incentive to tell them not to do that. I think this mismatch is fundamentally due to the asymmetrical cost of failure. For VCs, it's a bummer if the goals of the current round are not met, leading to the company folding or an acquisition on disappointing terms, but it's arguably even worse for the company to sputter along, barely staying afloat from round to round, but never really catching fire, because they have to keep funds tied up in it, without ever getting the return multiple they're looking for. But the people who actually work at the company have a much more concentrated investment in it simply staying alive, even at the price of short-termism. It's just fundamentally different risk profiles! Maybe VCs should gift founders enough wealth up-front to be financially independent. This would go a long way to align their risk profile :)