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It wasn't the only way out. We were the ones that backed them into a corner with the "unconditional" qualification while behind closed doors it really wasn't u
by pests 3y ago
It wasn't the only way out.
We were the ones that backed them into a corner with the "unconditional" qualification while behind closed doors it really wasn't unconditional - so why not just make that public? That America would accept a non-unconditonal surrender?
Or did we not want to embarrass Roosevelt and Churchill?
If we were willing to make concessions and allow the Emperor to remain in position, why not just disclose this?
It's a complicated time and nearing 100 years ago. I don't think we will ever have a solid answer to this.
- defrost 3y agoThere's a lot of "after the fact" discussion about the dropping of the two nuclear weapons. It was always a given that they would be dropped - developed for use on Germany, completed after the German surrender .. where else could the then DoD live field test the two "actual bomb" designs that resulted from the single most expensive R&D program in the world to date? The US President was only recently made President and prior to that had no knowledge of the programme not being on the need to know list .. Japan was being carpet bombed, with 72 cities already completely destroyed there was a looming shortage of "clean" untouched test sites .. that were going to be destroyed with or without atomic weapons. It's a subject with a wealth of viewpoints, you might, if you've not seen it already, like a historians helicopter view of the range of positions taken and the movement toward a post factum consensus view many years later (2013 IIRC) https://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/2013/03/08/the-decision-to-use-the-bomb-a-consensus-view/ https://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/2013/03/08/the-decision-to-u...
- pests 3y agoInteresting read, thanks. I would say I definitely lean closer towards the revisionist take and while I do see the middle ground Walker is trying to state exists, I feel like its just a toned down version of the revisionist argument for the traditionalists stake. I do believe part of Japan leadership wanted to surrender and would have if we did not require it "unconditionally". We definitely kept the bomb secret in order to show off our power to the Soviet Union - we hid as much as we could and only alluded to our new weapon in passing. "Defeat is not surrender" is such a cop out. Now wars can only end in surrender? Says who? Why can't we draw up a truce and just end-it-now instead of this invade-or-bomb nonsense? Why did it have to be one or the other? I do agree it was Total War and the morality of a lot of these things were not on the mind of many, espically Truman after inheriting the situation.
- defrost 3y ago> We definitely kept the bomb secret in order to show off our power to the Soviet Union Err, the British, Australians, and Soviets "in the loop" knew about the bomb development programme - the British and Australians talked the US into starting it after they equivicated for some time, not even taking Einstein seriously about the supposed "need" to develop it. The Soviets were closely in touch with the progress of the Manhatten Project thanks to Klaus Fuchs who tackled the thorny problem of imploding the fissionable core of the plutonium bomb and was present at the Trinity test. Which does pose the question, secret from whom? Certainly from the US Vice President and general US public, the general Commonwealth and Axis public, etc. Not so much from Allied high command nor even Axis command suspicions - both the Germans and Japanese had their own nascent atomic programs which had promise but lacked resource commitment.
- pests 3y agoThank you for the details. There really is so much at play here not even bringing in the spying. I've had a question maybe you would know ever since finishing the Rhodes book relating to the initiator. Maybe its a sign of the times the book was written, or maybe purposfully leaving details out, but I had some confusion. At one point its talks about the gun-style design and how it needed to be a certain size in order to accelerate the bullet up to enough speed so that it does not become critical before the bullet makes complete contact with the target. There was what felt like an entire chapter to speccing out the gun and how fast the bullet would need to travel etc. Then later it talks about needing to design a foil initiator which would provide an additional source of neurtons to set it off, which would be sandwiched between the bullet and target. Then what was the worry about the gun size / bullet speed? This was seperate from the initiator that was needed for the implosion type bomb and what I presume Fuchs helped with. I am almost positive this is what I read but the book I feel is unclear or states different things at different times about this topic. Its 1200+ pages and I haven't gone back to look, but just wondering if anyone knows the details here. Did the gun-type bomb need an additional initator or was just shooting the two parts together enough?
- defrost 3y ago
- bell-cot 3y ago> It wasn't the only way out... Um, true? But it's rather rare in human affairs for the side that is obviously & quickly winning a brutal war to make much in the way of concessions. > ...embarrass Roosevelt and Churchill. Recall that President Roosevelt had died back on 12 April, and former Prime Minster Churchill had suffered a crushing defeat in the UK General Election of 6 July. That defeat was very widely foreseen, so "Churchill will soon be gone" was baked into everyone's plans. > - so why not just make that public? [...] why not just disclose this? You sound unfamiliar with WWII-era security practices, and likewise with how easy it is to shoot yourself in the foot by talking about secret peace negotiations. Those are a very complex game, played for very high stakes. To the extent that you tell the public the truth, you are revealing a lot about your priorities and strategy to the enemy, who is busy killing your people every day. To the extent that you tell the public lies...so long as the public eventually concludes that (1) it was sadly necessary, as part of the negotiating process, and (2) you did negotiate a good deal for them...those lies will pretty much be forgiven.