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System call pinning has been a classic example of an OpenBSD approach to exploit mitigation that exploit developers dunk on; a thread just a couple months ago:
by tptacek 3y ago
System call pinning has been a classic example of an OpenBSD approach to exploit mitigation that exploit developers dunk on; a thread just a couple months ago:
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=38579913 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=38579913
I think? this is the same work, just now merged into the kernel?
- steveklabnik 3y agoThere is a paragraph in the article dedicated to this, starting with: > Security researchers have expressed doubt about how useful this check is at preventing compromises. Doesn't cite the HN thread, but two other cases. > I think? this is the same work, just now merged into the kernel? That is my understanding, yes. From the article: > In December, De Raadt sent a patch to the OpenBSD mailing list expanding OpenBSD's restrictions on the locations from which a process can make system calls. ... Now that patch has been merged, finishing a process which De Raadt said has taken five years.
- PrimeMcFly 3y ago> a classic example of an OpenBSD approach to exploit mitigation that exploit developers dunk on Part of why it is hard to take its reputation as as security focused OS seriously.
- irdc 3y agoIn their defence, the OpenBSD developers do put their mon^H^H^Htime where their mouth is and release their work even with dubious features included. How much those features actually matter, instead of how much expert opinion says they matter, can then be judged in the wild. Failed experiments are also a good part of research.
- PrimeMcFly 3y agoWhat can also be judged is ignoring expert advice in favor of rolling their own inferior solutions.
- user3939382 3y agoWhose and what expert advice did they ignore?
- falserum 3y agoMine (statistically at least; I am a random internet person, who does not contribute to any OS development)
- PrimeMcFly 3y agoExploit developers telling them their mitigations won't do anything, for starters.
- yjftsjthsd-h 3y agoHas that "dunking" manifested in actual exploits?
- tptacek 3y agoI dunno. Has it?
- yjftsjthsd-h 3y agoWell since https://www.openbsd.org/ https://www.openbsd.org/ still says > Only two remote holes in the default install, in a heck of a long time! I'm assuming not, but I could always be mistaken.
- opnitro 3y agoThis is a _very_ qualified statement. The default OpenBSD install enables an extremely small amount of services by default, which is why they can claim that. I'm not saying that's wrong, or a bad idea, but obviously a platform that doesn't enable many network services is going to have a small amount of remote holes. this is on top of a lot of very careful programming and interesting security research, and this post isn't meant to take anything away from the OpenBSD devs.
- wolverine876 3y ago> The default OpenBSD install enables an extremely small amount of services by default, which is why they can claim that. Probably this issue has been hashed out many times over the decades, but arguably the security gain isn't a fortunate or incidental benefit of minimizing default enabled services, nor a cheat like weighted dice, it's a very real benefit resulting from an effective, intentional technique. Maybe other OSes should do the same, and then everyone would have that benefit. The other OSes have other priorities, and that's fine. Embrace that. Yes, most users (and developers) don't want to deal with the compatibility issues. But when you say OpenBSD has few default security holes because they have few default services, that's a complement.