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The original 737 was the smallest aircraft in Boeing's passenger jet family, behind the four-engine 707 (which was already becoming obsolete at the time and was

by rob74 3y ago

The original 737 was the smallest aircraft in Boeing's passenger jet family, behind the four-engine 707 (which was already becoming obsolete at the time and was eventually replaced by the 747) and the three-engine 727. I mean, this was the original 737 model: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737#/media/File:Boeing_737-130,_Lufthansa_AN2056613.jpg https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737#/media/File:Boeing_... - Lufthansa used it as a "CityJet", which is its regional brand! That's why the 737 sits so low to the ground, so it can be loaded and unloaded with simple equipment (or even without equipment) at small regional airports. And that proved a major issue when more efficient turbofan engines with ever higher bypass ratios (-> bigger diameters) came about, so they had to use various tricks to acommodate these engines, and the latest trick (MCAS) then backfired tragically. Besides that, the things Boeing can do to update the 737 are limited, or else the FAA might come along and say "this is not your grandfather's 737 anymore, it needs a new type certificate!".

MilStdJunkie 3y ago
False Equivalence is one of a big sawhorses I bring out for why things suck so much more now, in aerospace and defense generally. For the past 10-15 years, we've had mechanisms for quantitatively ballparking equivalence in pools of supportable assemblies and spared parts - but generally, no one wants to touch that. The purchasers of enterprise solutions (CAD, PDM, etc) want equivalence to be ultimately a financial decision, not a question solved by materials, interfaces, fluid dynamics, frickin' electricity, etc. Your problem there is . . well, jeez, look around. You're treating completely different products like they're the same thing. Not exactly a new problem, either, but it sure is interesting how it's compounded since the great "financialization" experiment in American capitalism circa 1974, and with a whopper of a sequel post-2008. I am out of my sandbox here, but if I was a betting man, I would put the root cause of this nonsense in this bucket, i.e., lowering apparent risk (by making things look similar) so as to meet requirements of issuing larger financial instruments (bonds, etc).

by rob74 3y ago

MilStdJunkie 3y ago

False Equivalence is one of a big sawhorses I bring out for why things suck so much more now, in aerospace and defense generally. For the past 10-15 years, we've had mechanisms for quantitatively ballparking equivalence in pools of supportable assemblies and spared parts - but generally, no one wants to touch that. The purchasers of enterprise solutions (CAD, PDM, etc) want equivalence to be ultimately a financial decision, not a question solved by materials, interfaces, fluid dynamics, frickin' electricity, etc. Your problem there is . . well, jeez, look around. You're treating completely different products like they're the same thing. Not exactly a new problem, either, but it sure is interesting how it's compounded since the great "financialization" experiment in American capitalism circa 1974, and with a whopper of a sequel post-2008. I am out of my sandbox here, but if I was a betting man, I would put the root cause of this nonsense in this bucket, i.e., lowering apparent risk (by making things look similar) so as to meet requirements of issuing larger financial instruments (bonds, etc).