4 ms·

I suspect that Gisin has a very clear idea of what he means by "information" in this context, having worked for over 40 years at the forefront of theoretical ph

by n4r9 3y ago

I suspect that Gisin has a very clear idea of what he means by "information" in this context, having worked for over 40 years at the forefront of theoretical physics with a specialisation in quantum information theory.

kergonath 3y ago
I can link to people who’ve worked their whole life on various fields of Physics who still talk about perpetual motion. I am not saying he is wrong in this specific case, but an appeal to authority is not very convincing.
- n4r9 3y ago
  I've given your comment quite a lot of thought over the last few days. Maybe too much. At first I was inclined to agree with you that this is an appeal to authority, with the caveat that such appeals do not always constitute a fallacy. For example, if we both agreed that such a Gisin is an expert whose opinion on this topic can be trusted, then his statements are valid evidence for one way or another. But then I realised that the very claim being challenged is whether Gisin knows what he's talking about. Floating his credentials and experience feels like a valid contribution. For what it's worth, back in my PhD days I read several of his papers and saw a couple of his talks at conferences, and can confirm he's one of the leading researchers in the field and is particularly thoughtful and careful in his work.
mjburgess 3y ago
I don't have much issue with Gisin's solution, the idea that the reals are random is one solution to the problem of how to deal with them that I like (since, my meta-issue is whether reality is computable, I say it isnt, and randomness is not computable). There's a problem for people who think reality can be modelled by computable functions of finite inputs: this makes classical physics non-deterministic, because chaos requires infinite precision for determinism. So either you go for "reality is deterministic and continuous, and not computable" or "reality is non-deterministic, and discrete, and not computable" either option in this fork includes properties that offend the minds of the people who want everything to be discrete. I lean towards a preference for determinism & continuity (via, in QM, superdeterminism) since that's trivial to justify on our best physics
- n4r9 3y ago
  Well, I don't think Gisin's mind is offended by non-determinism: > I argue that there is another theory, similar but different from classical mechanics, with precisely the same set of predictions, though this alternative theory is indeterministic and in the footnote he describes indeterminism to mean: > given the present and the laws of nature, there is more than one possible future Out of curiosity, why do you lean towards superdeterminism and not other deterministic interpretations of QM such as Many-Worlds or Bohmian mechanics?

by n4r9 3y ago

kergonath 3y ago

I can link to people who’ve worked their whole life on various fields of Physics who still talk about perpetual motion. I am not saying he is wrong in this specific case, but an appeal to authority is not very convincing.

n4r9 3y ago
I've given your comment quite a lot of thought over the last few days. Maybe too much. At first I was inclined to agree with you that this is an appeal to authority, with the caveat that such appeals do not always constitute a fallacy. For example, if we both agreed that such a Gisin is an expert whose opinion on this topic can be trusted, then his statements are valid evidence for one way or another. But then I realised that the very claim being challenged is whether Gisin knows what he's talking about. Floating his credentials and experience feels like a valid contribution. For what it's worth, back in my PhD days I read several of his papers and saw a couple of his talks at conferences, and can confirm he's one of the leading researchers in the field and is particularly thoughtful and careful in his work.

mjburgess 3y ago

I don't have much issue with Gisin's solution, the idea that the reals are random is one solution to the problem of how to deal with them that I like (since, my meta-issue is whether reality is computable, I say it isnt, and randomness is not computable). There's a problem for people who think reality can be modelled by computable functions of finite inputs: this makes classical physics non-deterministic, because chaos requires infinite precision for determinism. So either you go for "reality is deterministic and continuous, and not computable" or "reality is non-deterministic, and discrete, and not computable" either option in this fork includes properties that offend the minds of the people who want everything to be discrete. I lean towards a preference for determinism & continuity (via, in QM, superdeterminism) since that's trivial to justify on our best physics

n4r9 3y ago
Well, I don't think Gisin's mind is offended by non-determinism: > I argue that there is another theory, similar but different from classical mechanics, with precisely the same set of predictions, though this alternative theory is indeterministic and in the footnote he describes indeterminism to mean: > given the present and the laws of nature, there is more than one possible future Out of curiosity, why do you lean towards superdeterminism and not other deterministic interpretations of QM such as Many-Worlds or Bohmian mechanics?