Having read the paper he's rapidly on his way to materialistic solipsism - which is fine as a circle of hell, but it doesn't have any bearing on reality. Other

Having read the paper he's rapidly on his way to materialistic solipsism - which is fine as a circle of hell, but it doesn't have any bearing on reality. Otherwise, he really isn't saying anything new from a philosophical perspective. Both Aristotle and St. Thomas long ago had a distinction between the act of sensing something and the act of naming (that is knowing) it. And noted that we can reflect on both of them. As he says: > Third, an attention schema cannot explain how a [non-empirically verifiable, non-material phenomena] emerges from the brain ... It explains how we believe, think, and claim to have such things, but it does not posit that we actually have [non-material phenomena] inside us. Having limited himself to only material things, he is necessarily constrained to only talk about epiphenomena if there is a non-material formal cause for the material phenomena. But empiricism is not all that is - there is no empirical proof for empiricism, it requires something outside of itself to support itself.