3 ms·
It seems like the principle of least power would apply here. There's value in restricting capability to no more than strictly necessary. Consider the risk of a
by couchand 3y ago
It seems like the principle of least power would apply here. There's value in restricting capability to no more than strictly necessary. Consider the risk of a compromised some-small-obscure-system.corporate.com in the presence of a mission-critical-system.corporate.com when both are issued wildcard certs.
Wildcard certs are indeed a valuable tool, but there is no free lunch.
- baobun 3y agoYou'd usually put a reverse proxy exposing the services and terminating TLS with the wildcard cert. The individual services can still have individual non-wildcard internal-only certs signed by an internal CA. These don't need to touch an external CA or appear in CT logs - only the reverse proxy/proxies should ever hit these, and can be configured to trust the internal CA (only) explicitly.