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I'm told that the tunnels between the handsets and the corporate BES servers are encrypted and that RIM doesn't have the ability to do key escrow or any other k
by iigs 18y ago
I'm told that the tunnels between the handsets and the corporate BES servers are encrypted and that RIM doesn't have the ability to do key escrow or any other kind of on-demand analysis of the traffic. Even supposing that to not be true, the chances of espionage via blackberry surveillance are astronomically small compared even to people attaching data to an email and typing in "John C<tab>" to the To: list, getting John Competitor instead of John Coworker. This again is overshadowed by having a disgruntled or compromised employee on email threads leaking data.
Device loss can be mitigated by security policies (remote wipe and wipe on N bad passwords) and basic executive training on what to do in the event of a loss or theft.
Just about any other attack vector could be worse or at least as bad, and substantially easier to implement. Not really worried about it.
- anamax 18y ago> Device loss can be mitigated by security policies (remote wipe and wipe on N bad passwords) and basic executive training on what to do in the event of a loss or theft. Nope - device loss can't be mitigated by any post-loss action. At best, you can try to reduce data lose, actually exposure, but only to folks who don't know what they've "found". Any wipe scheme depends on the device continuing to be run under the original programming. If the KGB gets Obama's cell, they pull the storage devices and start looking at them with their own tools, completely circumventing any "wipe" scheme. BTW - "wipe on N bad passwords" can enable a denial of service attack....