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Having read Nick Wallis' excellent book on this matter, I think that, although the PO and Fujitsu acted in a despicable and criminal manner, the institution tha

Having read Nick Wallis' excellent book on this matter, I think that, although the PO and Fujitsu acted in a despicable and criminal manner, the institution that really failed was British Justice. People were sent to jail on the basis of a single number spat out from a black box called Horizon. And to charge someone of false accounting when the system didn't give them much of an option and they communicated it to the helpline baffles me. It seems like their lawyers were pretty useless.

yrro 3y ago
> People were sent to jail on the basis of a single number spat out from a black box called Horizon. Something also has to be done about the unjust consequences of plea bargaining. Many were convicted on the basis that they admitted to crimes that they did not commit. I think we also have to get rid of Magistrate's courts and private prosecutions. It's ridiculous that these still exist in a modern state that operates under the presumption of the rule of law.
- actionfromafar 3y ago
  The UK is modern in a sense of course but it's really archaic when it comes to jurisdiction.
- bokononon 3y ago
  The postmasters' lawyers have to be put in front of the Inquiry for this utter deriliction of duty.
  - thinkingemote 3y ago
    Many of them have done. Most have either said I don't remember or I was only following orders from above. A few might make the concession that they were misled. One exception would be one barrister who it seemed to be to express genuine regret. Even he said he was in denial for a long time and only came to the realisation recently.
    - deleted 3y ago
      [deleted]
    - pfdietz 3y ago
      > I was only following orders from above Nuremberg has entered the chat.
- Mvandenbergh 3y ago
  Plea bargains are heavily restricted in the UK and many of these cases were heard in Crown courts. I agree about getting rid of private prosecutions though.
b112 3y ago
Agree that the courts are somewhat to blame. But really, to me, the full blame should be on the Post Office, and those involved. Trying to conceal problems? Purposefully ignoring bugs? Not listening to, well, everyone. Lying to the courts? People need to be in jail, and starting at the top. I'm not going to absolve Fujitsu, but I have worked government contracts in Canada. They constantly change, morph requirements, not for any real reasons other than "Oh you build this entire thing? We didn't think of X, let's add that". Meanwhile, X basically means an entire rewrite. I've even had situations where "Let's add X" happens, then after done, "Aw, never mind, remove that". It's a different world.
- robertlagrant 3y ago
  I'm not sure that both of these can be true at once: > Agree that the courts are somewhat to blame. > But really, to me, the full blame should be on the Post Office, and those involved. Anyway. > They constantly change, morph requirements All software systems are like that. Even if they weren't, the moment a new law comes in you'd need to change them anyway. If the engineering process and build can't withstand change, that's a problem. It seems clear that the Post Office and Fujitsu were complicit in the coverup, and the justice system utterly failed the defendants. All three are so poorly behaved, I hope some change will be triggered. Sadly, I think the way of the world is all organisations regress to the mean, and lots of them are allowed to let their mean get pretty low.
- Xylakant 3y ago
  I consider “the full blame should be on the Post Office, and those involved.” a dangerous position. A systems must hold even if individuals fail or behave in malicious ways, and focusing strongly on individual culpability tends to overshadow the failures of the system. It’s very easy to go on from there to “If those individuals had just acted properly, none of this would have happened.” I don’t mean to diminish the culpability of all those involved in the coverup, but the system needs fixing more than they need punishment. Fixing the system has a chance of preventing future harm, punishment does not, at least not to the same extend.
  - lupire 3y ago
moritonal 3y ago
Creeping around the matter of when can code be trusted. To my knowledge the UK doesn't have the strictest methods to qualify code as "correct in the eyes of the law". Anyone know more on this?
- edent 3y ago
  As I understand it, the problem is one of hyperbolic doubt. Imagine if you were on trial where the evidence against you came from, say, a computerised breathalyser. You might argue that the code has bugs. Then that the configuration was wrong. Then that the hardware design was faulty. Then that the individual components were broken. Then that the data was altered in transmission. Then that a hacker got in. Then that a cosmic ray corrupted the data. And so on. The defendant has no proof that the evidence is faulty, and the producers of the evidence can demonstrate (to some degree) that their hardware & software are correct. At some point, the court has to accept the evidence presented to it. In the UK, at the moment, the assumption is that a computer is operating correctly unless shown otherwise. The BCS (I'm a member) goes in to a little detail about why they think this presumption should change https://www.bcs.org/articles-opinion-and-research/computer-is-always-right-law-must-be-urgently-reviewed-to-stop-another-post-office-scandal-says-professional-body/ https://www.bcs.org/articles-opinion-and-research/computer-i...
- RichieAHB 3y ago
  It feels like that might be a fair point in other context but as one of your sibling posts says: this is just double entry book keeping. Print out the transactions with their timestamps and it feels this should have been very clearly a computer error given the duplicates etc.
  - cge 3y ago
    I recall seeing in released emails about the Callendar Square bug that it's debatable as to whether what the system was doing was properly double entry. In that case, my interpretation of the emails was that there were transactions that were nominally recorded as multiple double-entry transactions, but involved, eg, a transfer from account A to a hidden outstanding account X, and a transfer from account from X to account B. Then the account X wasn't actually tracked anywhere or even expected to balance on any individual system: it appears that when multiple counters at the location were involved, the transactions weren't necessarily synchronized between them. In that case, if you have three £1k transfers from A to X (two of which are duplicates), and one £1k transfer from X to B, then it will look like £2k disappeared unless you check the balance of X. To me, that sounds like an accounting system made by people who fundamentally didn't understand the point of double-entry accounting, because a double-entry accounting system that uses hidden or untracked accounts entirely removes that point and is just equivalent to a single-entry accounting system. Presumably, if all those transactions were properly stored and then combined, a full double-entry ledger could be reconstructed, but it appears the system itself couldn't do that in at least some cases. Of course, there also seems to be the suggestion that part of the Post Office's argument to subpostmasters was that even if the problems were obvious, like clear duplicate transactions, they were still liable per the contract.
ActionHank 3y ago
I don't understand why someone didn't push for an itemized breakdown as a double-entry ledger. This would have covered the shifts in money and where they came from and is one of the most basic accounting tools.
- db48x 3y ago
  The Horizon system failed to keep accurate records. It was a kind of distributed database, with individual users entering data on their terminals and occasionally connecting (potentially via dialup, iirc) to a central system to sync their records. But it was implemented badly, and records could and did get lost or modified. Records could be edited at any time by any of several parties, including the postmasters, but then when they were synced those edits could be silently lost. The resulting ledger does not and can not accurately reflect reality, thus the lost money and the convictions.
  - sorokod 3y ago
    Assuming that an itemized breakdown was requested, this is a possible answer as to why it can't be provided. How can a prosecution continue following such answer is a different question.
    - db48x 3y ago
      The prosecution would happily provide the itemized transactions, because the missing transactions are exactly what they are prosecuting. They know there were N pieces of mail that day, but payment was recorded only for N − 2 or whatever. The lies and coverup from the Postal service and Fujitsu were to there to hide the flaws in the system from the courts and the defendants. Even the prosecutors have said that they were completely in the dark. It’s only now that the independent reports are out that everyone knows the details. Unless you know about the bugs in the system, the itemized transaction list makes it look exactly like the cashiers were pocketing cash and not actually ringing up the sales. It’s a classic scam that any competent retail manager or owner knows to guard against. The only difference is that these cashiers nominally own the stores they run. If they pocketed the cash from the sale of a candy bar then there would be no crime; the cash was theirs to begin with. But since they are also working for a third party (the post office), the possibility of theft is a real one.
mvc 3y ago
It seems nuts to me that the Post Office was allowed to prosecute their own cases rather than pass what information they had to the police who could conduct an independent investigation.

yrro 3y ago

> People were sent to jail on the basis of a single number spat out from a black box called Horizon. Something also has to be done about the unjust consequences of plea bargaining. Many were convicted on the basis that they admitted to crimes that they did not commit. I think we also have to get rid of Magistrate's courts and private prosecutions. It's ridiculous that these still exist in a modern state that operates under the presumption of the rule of law.

actionfromafar 3y ago
The UK is modern in a sense of course but it's really archaic when it comes to jurisdiction.
bokononon 3y ago
The postmasters' lawyers have to be put in front of the Inquiry for this utter deriliction of duty.
- thinkingemote 3y ago
  Many of them have done. Most have either said I don't remember or I was only following orders from above. A few might make the concession that they were misled. One exception would be one barrister who it seemed to be to express genuine regret. Even he said he was in denial for a long time and only came to the realisation recently.
  - deleted 3y ago
    [deleted]
  - pfdietz 3y ago
    > I was only following orders from above Nuremberg has entered the chat.
Mvandenbergh 3y ago
Plea bargains are heavily restricted in the UK and many of these cases were heard in Crown courts. I agree about getting rid of private prosecutions though.

b112 3y ago

Agree that the courts are somewhat to blame. But really, to me, the full blame should be on the Post Office, and those involved. Trying to conceal problems? Purposefully ignoring bugs? Not listening to, well, everyone. Lying to the courts? People need to be in jail, and starting at the top. I'm not going to absolve Fujitsu, but I have worked government contracts in Canada. They constantly change, morph requirements, not for any real reasons other than "Oh you build this entire thing? We didn't think of X, let's add that". Meanwhile, X basically means an entire rewrite. I've even had situations where "Let's add X" happens, then after done, "Aw, never mind, remove that". It's a different world.

robertlagrant 3y ago
I'm not sure that both of these can be true at once: > Agree that the courts are somewhat to blame. > But really, to me, the full blame should be on the Post Office, and those involved. Anyway. > They constantly change, morph requirements All software systems are like that. Even if they weren't, the moment a new law comes in you'd need to change them anyway. If the engineering process and build can't withstand change, that's a problem. It seems clear that the Post Office and Fujitsu were complicit in the coverup, and the justice system utterly failed the defendants. All three are so poorly behaved, I hope some change will be triggered. Sadly, I think the way of the world is all organisations regress to the mean, and lots of them are allowed to let their mean get pretty low.
Xylakant 3y ago
I consider “the full blame should be on the Post Office, and those involved.” a dangerous position. A systems must hold even if individuals fail or behave in malicious ways, and focusing strongly on individual culpability tends to overshadow the failures of the system. It’s very easy to go on from there to “If those individuals had just acted properly, none of this would have happened.” I don’t mean to diminish the culpability of all those involved in the coverup, but the system needs fixing more than they need punishment. Fixing the system has a chance of preventing future harm, punishment does not, at least not to the same extend.
- lupire 3y ago

moritonal 3y ago

Creeping around the matter of when can code be trusted. To my knowledge the UK doesn't have the strictest methods to qualify code as "correct in the eyes of the law". Anyone know more on this?

edent 3y ago
As I understand it, the problem is one of hyperbolic doubt. Imagine if you were on trial where the evidence against you came from, say, a computerised breathalyser. You might argue that the code has bugs. Then that the configuration was wrong. Then that the hardware design was faulty. Then that the individual components were broken. Then that the data was altered in transmission. Then that a hacker got in. Then that a cosmic ray corrupted the data. And so on. The defendant has no proof that the evidence is faulty, and the producers of the evidence can demonstrate (to some degree) that their hardware & software are correct. At some point, the court has to accept the evidence presented to it. In the UK, at the moment, the assumption is that a computer is operating correctly unless shown otherwise. The BCS (I'm a member) goes in to a little detail about why they think this presumption should change https://www.bcs.org/articles-opinion-and-research/computer-is-always-right-law-must-be-urgently-reviewed-to-stop-another-post-office-scandal-says-professional-body/ https://www.bcs.org/articles-opinion-and-research/computer-i...
RichieAHB 3y ago
It feels like that might be a fair point in other context but as one of your sibling posts says: this is just double entry book keeping. Print out the transactions with their timestamps and it feels this should have been very clearly a computer error given the duplicates etc.
- cge 3y ago
  I recall seeing in released emails about the Callendar Square bug that it's debatable as to whether what the system was doing was properly double entry. In that case, my interpretation of the emails was that there were transactions that were nominally recorded as multiple double-entry transactions, but involved, eg, a transfer from account A to a hidden outstanding account X, and a transfer from account from X to account B. Then the account X wasn't actually tracked anywhere or even expected to balance on any individual system: it appears that when multiple counters at the location were involved, the transactions weren't necessarily synchronized between them. In that case, if you have three £1k transfers from A to X (two of which are duplicates), and one £1k transfer from X to B, then it will look like £2k disappeared unless you check the balance of X. To me, that sounds like an accounting system made by people who fundamentally didn't understand the point of double-entry accounting, because a double-entry accounting system that uses hidden or untracked accounts entirely removes that point and is just equivalent to a single-entry accounting system. Presumably, if all those transactions were properly stored and then combined, a full double-entry ledger could be reconstructed, but it appears the system itself couldn't do that in at least some cases. Of course, there also seems to be the suggestion that part of the Post Office's argument to subpostmasters was that even if the problems were obvious, like clear duplicate transactions, they were still liable per the contract.

ActionHank 3y ago

I don't understand why someone didn't push for an itemized breakdown as a double-entry ledger. This would have covered the shifts in money and where they came from and is one of the most basic accounting tools.

db48x 3y ago
The Horizon system failed to keep accurate records. It was a kind of distributed database, with individual users entering data on their terminals and occasionally connecting (potentially via dialup, iirc) to a central system to sync their records. But it was implemented badly, and records could and did get lost or modified. Records could be edited at any time by any of several parties, including the postmasters, but then when they were synced those edits could be silently lost. The resulting ledger does not and can not accurately reflect reality, thus the lost money and the convictions.
- sorokod 3y ago
  Assuming that an itemized breakdown was requested, this is a possible answer as to why it can't be provided. How can a prosecution continue following such answer is a different question.
  - db48x 3y ago
    The prosecution would happily provide the itemized transactions, because the missing transactions are exactly what they are prosecuting. They know there were N pieces of mail that day, but payment was recorded only for N − 2 or whatever. The lies and coverup from the Postal service and Fujitsu were to there to hide the flaws in the system from the courts and the defendants. Even the prosecutors have said that they were completely in the dark. It’s only now that the independent reports are out that everyone knows the details. Unless you know about the bugs in the system, the itemized transaction list makes it look exactly like the cashiers were pocketing cash and not actually ringing up the sales. It’s a classic scam that any competent retail manager or owner knows to guard against. The only difference is that these cashiers nominally own the stores they run. If they pocketed the cash from the sale of a candy bar then there would be no crime; the cash was theirs to begin with. But since they are also working for a third party (the post office), the possibility of theft is a real one.

mvc 3y ago

It seems nuts to me that the Post Office was allowed to prosecute their own cases rather than pass what information they had to the police who could conduct an independent investigation.