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> According to what you just said, everything we ever experience is talking about "not the real world itself" I don't know how that follows from what I said. W

by bsza 3y ago

> According to what you just said, everything we ever experience is talking about "not the real world itself" I don't know how that follows from what I said. When someone says "the floor is slippery", that refers to a very much real physical property of a very much real thing. When someone says "the floor is lava", that means we're playing a game. We have no problem distinguishing between the two. If you define yourself as the set of atoms that currently make you up, you are talking about the real world. If you define yourself as the set of your memories and experiences, you are not. The former definition has a lot less issues than the latter - firstly because you don't have to define anything further, you can just point at yourself; and secondly because a perfect clone of you would have the same set of memories and experiences, and that doesn't make them you. This is why "Why am I myself?" is much easier to answer when we're talking about your atoms. Now, if a theory can answer a question with ease, how is that question an argument against it? I've certainly never heard anyone say "If global warming is real, why are my car tires melting into the asphalt?".

foldr 3y ago
> Now, if a theory can answer a question with ease, how is that question an argument against it? Bowsamic may have a different take on this, but in my version of the argument, the point is not to answer the 'why' question. The 'why' question is just used to gesture at the relevant non-tautologous and apparently non-physical fact. So it doesn't really help with anything to redefine the terms of the question until it becomes a tautologous statement about atoms. All that shows is that physicalism doesn't have a problem with the concept of two physical things being the same thing – which isn't in dispute. >If you define yourself as the set of atoms that currently make you up [...] I don't see how I'm going to do this without some prior notion of who I am. Otherwise, one set of atoms is as good as any other.
- bsza 3y ago
  > The 'why' question is just used to gesture at the relevant non-tautologous and apparently non-physical fact Yeah, but to clearly define what that fact means, you'd have to introduce a bunch of intermediate definitions, and eventually you might just end up in physics-land again. It isn't physics' fault that the human brain is complicated. > I don't see how I'm going to do this without some prior notion of who I am Protip: if you pinch it and it hurts, it's probably yours :) Well, that or a very angry cat. To be more serious: having prior notions of things is fine. Required, even. We can't reason about things without having at least a vague understanding of the language. It can't be turtles all the way down.
  - foldr 3y ago
    >and eventually you might just end up in physics-land again. Sure, anything might turn out to be explicable by future physics (or indeed, future astrology, future phrenology, or any possible future knowledge). There are no knock-down arguments in this domain. The point is that the fact of your personal conscious identity is apparently not a physical fact, which is a prima facie argument against some of the stronger forms of physicalism. >To be more serious: having prior notions of things is fine. You can't use the physical definition to dispense with other notions of personal identity if you need those very notions to bootstrap the physical definition (and maintain it over time, as your 'set of atoms' is constantly changing). To point out that your informal notion of self is connected somehow with a loosely-defined lump of physical stuff isn't really to succeed in reducing anything to physics. It's just to say what pretty much everyone agrees with: that humans have physical bodies.
    - bsza 3y ago
      > You can't use the physical definition to dispense with other notions of personal identity if you need those very notions to bootstrap the physical definition Now that you mention, I don't need to. "I" simply means "the person who is currently speaking" (or in this case, writing). This already determines, beyond reasonable doubt, which physical body we're talking about. No other definition needed, since you can't say "I" without speaking. QED. Sorry, I should have noticed this 4 comments earlier. (Caveat: this definition doesn’t feel satisfying, which might be the source of our disagreement, but I can’t put my finger on why - perhaps you can) > the fact of your personal conscious identity is apparently not a physical fact The human brain is astonishingly good at BS-ing itself, so I wouldn't attribute much to how you intuitively feel about your own conscious self. To me, this smells like a more abstract and philosophical version of the puddle analogy.
      - foldr 3y ago
        > "I" simply means "the person who is currently speaking" But on this definition you can raise the question of why the person who is currently speaking is the person who is currently speaking (which by alternating de re and de dicto interpretations can be understood in the same non-tautologous ways as e.g. "Why is the person who is currently the President the person who is currently the President?") So this linguistic analysis doesn't succeed in dissolving facts about personal identity into nothing. You still have the fact that you are who you are and not someone else. And the intuitive notion of personhood (on which your definition depends and which you haven't in any way reduced to physics) is intimately connected with the idea of a more-or-less uninterrupted stream of first-person conscious experience. > I wouldn't attribute much to how you intuitively feel about your own conscious self. If we set 'intuitive feelings' aside, then of course the whole problem of conscious experience disappears immediately.

by bsza 3y ago

foldr 3y ago

> Now, if a theory can answer a question with ease, how is that question an argument against it? Bowsamic may have a different take on this, but in my version of the argument, the point is not to answer the 'why' question. The 'why' question is just used to gesture at the relevant non-tautologous and apparently non-physical fact. So it doesn't really help with anything to redefine the terms of the question until it becomes a tautologous statement about atoms. All that shows is that physicalism doesn't have a problem with the concept of two physical things being the same thing – which isn't in dispute. >If you define yourself as the set of atoms that currently make you up [...] I don't see how I'm going to do this without some prior notion of who I am. Otherwise, one set of atoms is as good as any other.

bsza 3y ago
> The 'why' question is just used to gesture at the relevant non-tautologous and apparently non-physical fact Yeah, but to clearly define what that fact means, you'd have to introduce a bunch of intermediate definitions, and eventually you might just end up in physics-land again. It isn't physics' fault that the human brain is complicated. > I don't see how I'm going to do this without some prior notion of who I am Protip: if you pinch it and it hurts, it's probably yours :) Well, that or a very angry cat. To be more serious: having prior notions of things is fine. Required, even. We can't reason about things without having at least a vague understanding of the language. It can't be turtles all the way down.
- foldr 3y ago
  >and eventually you might just end up in physics-land again. Sure, anything might turn out to be explicable by future physics (or indeed, future astrology, future phrenology, or any possible future knowledge). There are no knock-down arguments in this domain. The point is that the fact of your personal conscious identity is apparently not a physical fact, which is a prima facie argument against some of the stronger forms of physicalism. >To be more serious: having prior notions of things is fine. You can't use the physical definition to dispense with other notions of personal identity if you need those very notions to bootstrap the physical definition (and maintain it over time, as your 'set of atoms' is constantly changing). To point out that your informal notion of self is connected somehow with a loosely-defined lump of physical stuff isn't really to succeed in reducing anything to physics. It's just to say what pretty much everyone agrees with: that humans have physical bodies.
  - bsza 3y ago
    > You can't use the physical definition to dispense with other notions of personal identity if you need those very notions to bootstrap the physical definition Now that you mention, I don't need to. "I" simply means "the person who is currently speaking" (or in this case, writing). This already determines, beyond reasonable doubt, which physical body we're talking about. No other definition needed, since you can't say "I" without speaking. QED. Sorry, I should have noticed this 4 comments earlier. (Caveat: this definition doesn’t feel satisfying, which might be the source of our disagreement, but I can’t put my finger on why - perhaps you can) > the fact of your personal conscious identity is apparently not a physical fact The human brain is astonishingly good at BS-ing itself, so I wouldn't attribute much to how you intuitively feel about your own conscious self. To me, this smells like a more abstract and philosophical version of the puddle analogy.
    - foldr 3y ago
      > "I" simply means "the person who is currently speaking" But on this definition you can raise the question of why the person who is currently speaking is the person who is currently speaking (which by alternating de re and de dicto interpretations can be understood in the same non-tautologous ways as e.g. "Why is the person who is currently the President the person who is currently the President?") So this linguistic analysis doesn't succeed in dissolving facts about personal identity into nothing. You still have the fact that you are who you are and not someone else. And the intuitive notion of personhood (on which your definition depends and which you haven't in any way reduced to physics) is intimately connected with the idea of a more-or-less uninterrupted stream of first-person conscious experience. > I wouldn't attribute much to how you intuitively feel about your own conscious self. If we set 'intuitive feelings' aside, then of course the whole problem of conscious experience disappears immediately.