8 ms·

Not quite. OCSP responses can be stapled to TLS handshakes to provide fresh revocation information. Online is needed if you want 100% fresh information, of cour

• ak217 3y ago
  PKI uses are not limited to TLS, and TLS uses are not limited to those where revocation information is readily accessible (due to proxying/distribution/compartmentalization/federation constraints). There is a variety of signature standards and protocols out there that rely on PKI to manage trust, and whose users are not at all keen on calling an untrusted URL to check an intermediate cert.
  • ivanr 3y ago
    That's a fair point [PKI without TLS], but I'd argue that 99.9% of situations will be with TLS. Thus supporting revocation can provide value for those. Out of curiosity, what without-TLS use cases do you have in mind?
    • ak217 3y ago
      Most SSO runs on SAML, which uses XML Signature, which uses PKI certificate chains without TLS. Even if you think all SSO will migrate to OIDC, the EU has enacted laws around electronic signatures that basically enshrine the use of XML Signature (with all its problems) for the foreseeable future. A lot of countries beyond the EU (many LatAm countries, for example) have followed suit. There are other signature protocols that use certificate chains as well, and devices and networks that should not be making network calls when validating such signatures. And as I mentioned, TLS uses are not limited to those where revocation information is readily accessible.