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> I have "experiences", they just don't really have the properties that a naive interpretation of sensory data would entail. You don't think your experiences h

> I have "experiences", they just don't really have the properties that a naive interpretation of sensory data would entail. You don't think your experiences have sensations? > Funny, because I feel a mild sense of irritation by humans pretending that their flawed senses yields some kind of direct observation of fundamental reality. I never said anything about fundamental reality. I don't understand saying we're literal p-zombies. You have to explain away your sensations, dreams, inner dialog etc., by appealing to some theoretical commitment. I'm not claiming what consciousness is, only that we have it.

naasking 3y ago
> You don't think your experiences have sensations? I don't think sensations are what they appear to be either. Eliminative materialism is very misunderstood. > I never said anything about fundamental reality But you did, by claiming that we have consciousness. The only reason you think you have consciousness is an alleged direct perception of subjective qualities. There are only two real paths to reconciliating this with some form of scientifically sound materialism: panspychism, where subjective qualities permeate all of reality and we are perceiving some of them, or concluding that our perceptions are flawed and untrustworthy and so the subjective qualities we think we're perceiving are not real/illusory (eliminative materialism). Given the demonstrable flaws in all other perceptions, the most parsimonious position seems clear. Of course, you could try to resurrect idealism, but idealism is very problematic. > I don't understand saying we're literal p-zombies. P-zombies believe they have consciousness, say they have it, write whole screeds about how absurd it is to claim they don't have it, but they don't have the subjective qualities as we've defined them. Sounds like a bullseye to me.
- goatlover 3y ago
  > But you did, by claiming that we have consciousness. The only reason you think you have consciousness is an alleged direct perception of subjective qualities. We don't perceive subjective qualities, subjective qualities constitute our perceptions, dreams, memories and other conscious mental states. > There are only two real paths to reconciliating this with some form of scientifically sound materialism: If you have a commitment to doing so. I don't particularly, since materialism is model of how the world is constituted, abstracted from our shared conscious experiences. A very useful one with scientific backing. But nature is more than what we think it is (map/territory distinction). And there are other options you omitted such as identity theory, strong emergence, property dualism, neutral monism and cognitive closure. They all have their drawbacks, but so does every attempt to account for consciousness. > P-zombies believe they have consciousness, say they have it, write whole screeds about how absurd it is to claim they don't have it, but they don't have the subjective qualities as we've defined them. Sounds like a bullseye to me. Yes, but by definition, they lack the subjective qualities of our experiences. I believe Chalmers coined the term to demonstrate the problem with physicalism.
  - mannykannot 3y ago
    >> P-zombies believe they have consciousness, say they have it... > Yes, but by definition, they lack the subjective qualities of our experiences. And, also by definition, each p-zombie has (at least in an accessible possible world) a physically identical, but conscious, doppelgänger. Speaking and writing are physical processes, so in any circumstance where the conscious doppelgänger writes about the reality of its consciousness, the physically-identical p_zombie will do the same. In the case of the p-zombie, there was a causal process leading to the physical act of writing in which consciousness played no part - and, ex hypothesi, the same physical causality must have played out in the zombie's conscious doppelgänger. In general, whatever explains the zombie's observable characteristics is sufficient to explain the doppelgänger's observable characteristics, and that explanation cannot be dependent on consciousness. In particular, if one accepts the possibility of p-zombies, one must logically accept that no explanation of consciousness, regardless of how thorough and well-supported it seems to be, has any basis in any facts about consciousness. A consistent belief in zombies seems to lead to epiphenomenalism, the notion that we have conscious experiences, but they play no part in what happens to our bodies. Frank Jackson, author of the well-known "Mary the neuroscientist" thought experiment, came to the same conclusion, which is why it appeared in a paper with the title "Epiphenomenal Qualia." For more on zombies, see Dennett, "The Unimagined Preposterousness of Zombies."
    - goatlover 3y ago
      Right, so one can reject the possibility of p-zombies. Consciousness plays a role in why we think we're conscious. > In particular, if one accepts the possibility of p-zombies, one must logically accept that no explanation of consciousness, regardless of how thorough and well-supported it seems to be, has any basis in any facts about consciousness. Although I disagree somewhat here, because logical isn't the same thing as physical. All you can say is there is no physical explanation of consciousness. But you could logically come up with one. For example, Chalmers has proposed an additional natural law connecting consciousness to information rich processes. Natural doesn't necessitate physical, if the universe contains more than physical stuff. Or if physicalism is the wrong ontology of nature. I take the p-zombie and Mary Room arguments to be critiques of physicalism.

naasking 3y ago

> You don't think your experiences have sensations? I don't think sensations are what they appear to be either. Eliminative materialism is very misunderstood. > I never said anything about fundamental reality But you did, by claiming that we have consciousness. The only reason you think you have consciousness is an alleged direct perception of subjective qualities. There are only two real paths to reconciliating this with some form of scientifically sound materialism: panspychism, where subjective qualities permeate all of reality and we are perceiving some of them, or concluding that our perceptions are flawed and untrustworthy and so the subjective qualities we think we're perceiving are not real/illusory (eliminative materialism). Given the demonstrable flaws in all other perceptions, the most parsimonious position seems clear. Of course, you could try to resurrect idealism, but idealism is very problematic. > I don't understand saying we're literal p-zombies. P-zombies believe they have consciousness, say they have it, write whole screeds about how absurd it is to claim they don't have it, but they don't have the subjective qualities as we've defined them. Sounds like a bullseye to me.

goatlover 3y ago
> But you did, by claiming that we have consciousness. The only reason you think you have consciousness is an alleged direct perception of subjective qualities. We don't perceive subjective qualities, subjective qualities constitute our perceptions, dreams, memories and other conscious mental states. > There are only two real paths to reconciliating this with some form of scientifically sound materialism: If you have a commitment to doing so. I don't particularly, since materialism is model of how the world is constituted, abstracted from our shared conscious experiences. A very useful one with scientific backing. But nature is more than what we think it is (map/territory distinction). And there are other options you omitted such as identity theory, strong emergence, property dualism, neutral monism and cognitive closure. They all have their drawbacks, but so does every attempt to account for consciousness. > P-zombies believe they have consciousness, say they have it, write whole screeds about how absurd it is to claim they don't have it, but they don't have the subjective qualities as we've defined them. Sounds like a bullseye to me. Yes, but by definition, they lack the subjective qualities of our experiences. I believe Chalmers coined the term to demonstrate the problem with physicalism.
- mannykannot 3y ago
  >> P-zombies believe they have consciousness, say they have it... > Yes, but by definition, they lack the subjective qualities of our experiences. And, also by definition, each p-zombie has (at least in an accessible possible world) a physically identical, but conscious, doppelgänger. Speaking and writing are physical processes, so in any circumstance where the conscious doppelgänger writes about the reality of its consciousness, the physically-identical p_zombie will do the same. In the case of the p-zombie, there was a causal process leading to the physical act of writing in which consciousness played no part - and, ex hypothesi, the same physical causality must have played out in the zombie's conscious doppelgänger. In general, whatever explains the zombie's observable characteristics is sufficient to explain the doppelgänger's observable characteristics, and that explanation cannot be dependent on consciousness. In particular, if one accepts the possibility of p-zombies, one must logically accept that no explanation of consciousness, regardless of how thorough and well-supported it seems to be, has any basis in any facts about consciousness. A consistent belief in zombies seems to lead to epiphenomenalism, the notion that we have conscious experiences, but they play no part in what happens to our bodies. Frank Jackson, author of the well-known "Mary the neuroscientist" thought experiment, came to the same conclusion, which is why it appeared in a paper with the title "Epiphenomenal Qualia." For more on zombies, see Dennett, "The Unimagined Preposterousness of Zombies."
  - goatlover 3y ago
    Right, so one can reject the possibility of p-zombies. Consciousness plays a role in why we think we're conscious. > In particular, if one accepts the possibility of p-zombies, one must logically accept that no explanation of consciousness, regardless of how thorough and well-supported it seems to be, has any basis in any facts about consciousness. Although I disagree somewhat here, because logical isn't the same thing as physical. All you can say is there is no physical explanation of consciousness. But you could logically come up with one. For example, Chalmers has proposed an additional natural law connecting consciousness to information rich processes. Natural doesn't necessitate physical, if the universe contains more than physical stuff. Or if physicalism is the wrong ontology of nature. I take the p-zombie and Mary Room arguments to be critiques of physicalism.