3 ms·

You're saying that people shouldn't be surprised that they're conscious. That may be true, but it's irrelevant to the argument I was talking about. The relevant

by foldr 3y ago

You're saying that people shouldn't be surprised that they're conscious. That may be true, but it's irrelevant to the argument I was talking about. The relevant fact there isn't merely that you're conscious, but that you are (consciously) the particular person that you are. Bowsamic orignally posed a question that gets at the relevant fact: "Why am I me and not someone or something else?" However, the argument here doesn't rest on this question being puzzling. The argument is simply that the relevant fact of personal identity (whether puzzling or not) does not seem to reduce to any specifiable set of physical facts. The form of the argument is exactly like a Platonist argument against physicalism: "2+2=4" is a fact and does not reduce to any set of physical facts; therefore not all facts are physical facts. This argument does not require the assumption that truths of arithmetic are surprising or difficult to explain. However, I think the irreducibility claim is more compelling in the case of personal identity than for mathematical truths.

bsza 3y ago
To a physicalist, the only way to interpret the question "why am I me and not someone else?" is "why is my physical body identical to my physical body and not identical to another physical body?". The framework simply doesn't allow alternative interpretations. This interpretation is a tautology, because in the universe, things are identical to themselves, and only to themselves. If you are using an abstract definition of "yourself" (such as your brain's internal representation of you), you are no longer talking about physical objects, so of course your question can't be answered using physical facts alone. Similarly, "2+2=4" is a statement about our abstract representation of the world, not the real world itself. That we can reason about integers without relying on facts about the real world doesn't mean that integers are any more "real" than unicorns - or for that matter, your concept of "self".
- bowsamic 3y ago
  That's why it's a good argument against physicalism. According to what you just said, everything we ever experience is talking about "not the real world itself" according to physicalism, therefore why does it ever make sense to assert the "real world itself" over what we actually experience? It's like watching a movie and believing in the movie more than the fact you are sitting watching a screen.
  - bsza 3y ago
    > According to what you just said, everything we ever experience is talking about "not the real world itself" I don't know how that follows from what I said. When someone says "the floor is slippery", that refers to a very much real physical property of a very much real thing. When someone says "the floor is lava", that means we're playing a game. We have no problem distinguishing between the two. If you define yourself as the set of atoms that currently make you up, you are talking about the real world. If you define yourself as the set of your memories and experiences, you are not. The former definition has a lot less issues than the latter - firstly because you don't have to define anything further, you can just point at yourself; and secondly because a perfect clone of you would have the same set of memories and experiences, and that doesn't make them you. This is why "Why am I myself?" is much easier to answer when we're talking about your atoms. Now, if a theory can answer a question with ease, how is that question an argument against it? I've certainly never heard anyone say "If global warming is real, why are my car tires melting into the asphalt?".
    - foldr 3y ago
      > Now, if a theory can answer a question with ease, how is that question an argument against it? Bowsamic may have a different take on this, but in my version of the argument, the point is not to answer the 'why' question. The 'why' question is just used to gesture at the relevant non-tautologous and apparently non-physical fact. So it doesn't really help with anything to redefine the terms of the question until it becomes a tautologous statement about atoms. All that shows is that physicalism doesn't have a problem with the concept of two physical things being the same thing – which isn't in dispute. >If you define yourself as the set of atoms that currently make you up [...] I don't see how I'm going to do this without some prior notion of who I am. Otherwise, one set of atoms is as good as any other.
      - bsza 3y ago
        > The 'why' question is just used to gesture at the relevant non-tautologous and apparently non-physical fact Yeah, but to clearly define what that fact means, you'd have to introduce a bunch of intermediate definitions, and eventually you might just end up in physics-land again. It isn't physics' fault that the human brain is complicated. > I don't see how I'm going to do this without some prior notion of who I am Protip: if you pinch it and it hurts, it's probably yours :) Well, that or a very angry cat. To be more serious: having prior notions of things is fine. Required, even. We can't reason about things without having at least a vague understanding of the language. It can't be turtles all the way down.

by foldr 3y ago

bsza 3y ago

To a physicalist, the only way to interpret the question "why am I me and not someone else?" is "why is my physical body identical to my physical body and not identical to another physical body?". The framework simply doesn't allow alternative interpretations. This interpretation is a tautology, because in the universe, things are identical to themselves, and only to themselves. If you are using an abstract definition of "yourself" (such as your brain's internal representation of you), you are no longer talking about physical objects, so of course your question can't be answered using physical facts alone. Similarly, "2+2=4" is a statement about our abstract representation of the world, not the real world itself. That we can reason about integers without relying on facts about the real world doesn't mean that integers are any more "real" than unicorns - or for that matter, your concept of "self".

bowsamic 3y ago
That's why it's a good argument against physicalism. According to what you just said, everything we ever experience is talking about "not the real world itself" according to physicalism, therefore why does it ever make sense to assert the "real world itself" over what we actually experience? It's like watching a movie and believing in the movie more than the fact you are sitting watching a screen.
- bsza 3y ago
  > According to what you just said, everything we ever experience is talking about "not the real world itself" I don't know how that follows from what I said. When someone says "the floor is slippery", that refers to a very much real physical property of a very much real thing. When someone says "the floor is lava", that means we're playing a game. We have no problem distinguishing between the two. If you define yourself as the set of atoms that currently make you up, you are talking about the real world. If you define yourself as the set of your memories and experiences, you are not. The former definition has a lot less issues than the latter - firstly because you don't have to define anything further, you can just point at yourself; and secondly because a perfect clone of you would have the same set of memories and experiences, and that doesn't make them you. This is why "Why am I myself?" is much easier to answer when we're talking about your atoms. Now, if a theory can answer a question with ease, how is that question an argument against it? I've certainly never heard anyone say "If global warming is real, why are my car tires melting into the asphalt?".
  - foldr 3y ago
    > Now, if a theory can answer a question with ease, how is that question an argument against it? Bowsamic may have a different take on this, but in my version of the argument, the point is not to answer the 'why' question. The 'why' question is just used to gesture at the relevant non-tautologous and apparently non-physical fact. So it doesn't really help with anything to redefine the terms of the question until it becomes a tautologous statement about atoms. All that shows is that physicalism doesn't have a problem with the concept of two physical things being the same thing – which isn't in dispute. >If you define yourself as the set of atoms that currently make you up [...] I don't see how I'm going to do this without some prior notion of who I am. Otherwise, one set of atoms is as good as any other.
    - bsza 3y ago
      > The 'why' question is just used to gesture at the relevant non-tautologous and apparently non-physical fact Yeah, but to clearly define what that fact means, you'd have to introduce a bunch of intermediate definitions, and eventually you might just end up in physics-land again. It isn't physics' fault that the human brain is complicated. > I don't see how I'm going to do this without some prior notion of who I am Protip: if you pinch it and it hurts, it's probably yours :) Well, that or a very angry cat. To be more serious: having prior notions of things is fine. Required, even. We can't reason about things without having at least a vague understanding of the language. It can't be turtles all the way down.