9 ms·
Framing Frames: Bypassing wi-fi encryption by manipulating transmit queues
- sipofwater 3y agoSource: "Interesting Links" at https://old.reddit.com/r/termux/comments/19573gg/encryption_decryption_android_11_operating_system/ https://old.reddit.com/r/termux/comments/19573gg/encryption_... ("Encryption, Decryption, Android 11 Operating System, Termux, And proot-distro Using Alpine Linux minirootfs: cryptsetup v2.6.1 And LUKS", old.reddit.com/r/termux/comments/19573gg/encryption_decryption_android_11_operating_system/).
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- londons_explore 3y agoI can't quite see how this can be a spec bug... I mean, why would client A be able to change the key used for communicating with client B? Does this rely on some kind of confusion between clients? ie. force a client to disconnect, then the attacker connects using its mac address, and receives all the queued frames?
- Retr0id 3y agoThey use the words "lack of explicit guidance", so maybe more of an unspecced-bug rather than a spec bug - but it's the same thing at the end of the day.
- upofadown 3y agoSaying that the spec should contain more guidance implies that that guidance is relatively obvious. It also implies that there is one correct way to resolve the issue that the guidance would resolve. That might not be the case. So it is usually best not to claim a specification issue where none technically exists. Just state clearly what you think should be done and leave it at that. The specification might not be incomplete depending on what approach is eventually taken.
- 3abiton 3y ago> This exploits a design flaw in hotspot-like networks and allows the attacker to force an access points to encrypt yet to be queued frames using an adversary-chosen key, thereby bypassing Wi-Fi encryption entirely. Our attacks have a widespread impact as they affect various devices and operating systems (Linux, FreeBSD, iOS, and Android) and because they can be used to hijack TCP connections or intercept client and web traffic Interesting approach, that seems to be limited to Hotspots or am I getting this wrong?
- cmrx64 3y agoSee section 5.1 about threat model, hotspot just describes the threat model (network of distrusting clients). They do explicitly do test against some hotspot implementations, but the vulnerability isn’t limited to those.
- tmd83 3y agoSo if the underlying connection isn't encrypted (like https) it essentially became open to anyone of the same network?
- kevindamm 3y agoIf you also know the adversary-chosen key, yes.
- dboreham 3y agoI thought we didn't rely on WiFi encryption since...long ago? Most hotspots don't even have encryption enabled.
- bell-cot 3y agoSecurity-wise, Wi-Fi has always been a steaming heap. And probably always will be.
- para_parolu 3y agoWhat are better alternatives for wireless connectivity?
- Retr0id 3y agoAlternative is the wrong question, I think. You should* assume the wireless connection itself is compromised and use an extra layer, like wireguard. *Assuming this makes sense within your threat model. It's not something I think I should care about much, personally. Everything important I do goes over https anyway.
- dale_glass 3y agoBut that shouldn't be necessary. WiFi itself should be doing whatever wireguard adds to this setup.
- Retr0id 3y agoIt shouldn't be necessary, yet WiFi continues to show that it is.
- bell-cot 3y agoNot to claim that 99% of users would show any preference for a better standard...but that's pretty much the problem. [Edit: Retr0id is perfectly correct...but even thinking in terms of a threat model has already excluded the 99%, if not more.]
- linuxlizard 3y agoWi-Fi has the same challenges as if someone just tapped an Ethernet cable. (Except the Ethernet line can't be sniffed from the parking lot.) The amount of unsecure traffic on a basic Ethernet network makes Wi-Fi security slightly better.
- linuxlizard 3y agoI swear Mathy Vanhoef has dedicated his life to making my life miserable. Every time he finds these wifi security problems, we get to spend weeks/months integrating and testing vendor patches.
- diggan 3y agoSounds like he is helping you discover who you should really be blaming for these found issues :)
- linuxlizard 3y agoHe's forcing me to work hard, dang it! I'm being forced to study WiFi carefully and learn his (really amazing) tools to fix these issues.
- tux3 3y agoSounds like the Wi-Fi Alliance is making your life complicated! From the makers of WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy), the latest "Wi-Fi CERTIFIED 7" update is sure to bring your business up to enterprise-quality standards of security.
- fulafel 3y agoWireless stuff has some bad times recently - bluetooth keyboard injection: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=38661182 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=38661182
- rjaco31 3y agoIt's written in the paper that the PoC code has been published. But there is no link anywhere?
- spidersenses 3y agoPaper: https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec23summer_355-schepers-prepub.pdf https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec23summer_355-schepers... Tool: https://github.com/vanhoefm/macstealer https://github.com/vanhoefm/macstealer
- dataflow 3y agoFor the life of me I don't understand either of these: - Why, after so many darn versions of Wi-Fi security standards, we still have attacks that just bypass encryption entirely. How do these not get caught during the design/implementation with so many people studying the specs for decades? - Why 99% of end-users should even care about these issues from a security standpoint, given they already have https and such (because the transport is already assumed to be untrusted), and given that people have been connecting to "unsecured" networks for decades now, without the sky falling. Is the added security of each version of WPA even relevant to normal people?
- teddyh 3y ago> How do these not get caught with so many people studying the specs for decades? Because extremely few people actually look at the detailed specs. You’d think more people did, but it turns out they don’t. > Is the added security of each version of WPA even relevant to normal people? It’s relevant for those who misguidedly have their network infrastructure set to trust all local network connections. In my experience, many people do.
- dataflow 3y ago> Because extremely few people actually look at the detailed specs. You’d think more people did, but it turns out they don’t. Well that's depressing :( > It’s relevant for those who misguidedly have their network infrastructure set to trust all local network connections. In my experience, many people do. For 99% of people worrying about "network infrastructure" would only be relevant at home, right? So the threat model here is some nefarious nearby actor (your tech-savvy neighbor? someone else parked nearby who hates you and knows how to do these hacks?) is trying to hack you? How often does this actually happen?
- chunky1994 3y agoI'd argue the number of startups that have trust all local network connections is not far behind. I doubt a company seriously considers their wifi connectivity as a threat vector until they get to a series B size. Hypothetically I'd imagine if you take early startup infrastructure snooping + <insert criminal act here> you probably have a criminal enterprise that's cashflow positive.
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- riedel 3y agoMaybe one should note that this was reported 9 month ago: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=35353264 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=35353264
- scrps 3y agoWi-Fi Alliance: Fixed management frame deauth in WPA3. Also Wi-Fi Alliance: Refactored(-ish) deauth to unprotected power-save bit.