Normally I would agree if an engineer directly knew what they were doing was bad and didn't say no but in the case of MCAS: pilots had no idea it was there. Yes

Normally I would agree if an engineer directly knew what they were doing was bad and didn't say no but in the case of MCAS: pilots had no idea it was there. Yes, it also wasn't properly redundant and that is bad but had the pilots known it had existed in the first place and understood it was operating off a single data source they would have acted accordingly and a lot of people would still be alive. Door plug I can't speak to. Hiding MCAS to avoid recertification was well above the paygrade of an engineer at a bench poking a circuit. Also, if you want a short version of how this stuff goes very wrong even when engineers do say something, the challenger disaster[1] movie is great. Chase it with the NASA documents[2] for the long version. [1]: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bvv2-7iOD_8 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bvv2-7iOD_8 [2]: https://www.nasa.gov/history/rogersrep/genindex.htm https://www.nasa.gov/history/rogersrep/genindex.htm Edit: typo