> I see a request for letterboxing in Brave, and a PR that does randomizing of some values instead: randomizing is the better way to go. Tor's approach to fin

> I see a request for letterboxing in Brave, and a PR that does randomizing of some values instead: randomizing is the better way to go. Tor's approach to fingerprinting seems misguided to me. Their idea is to make every single user appear to be identical so that you can always tell when someone is using Tor Browser, but you can't track which Tor Browser user a visitor is. The problem is that new fingerprinting techniques are found all the time, and as soon as even one is discovered that Tor Browser doesn't know about or hasn't updated to address you become 100% trackable. Instead of trying to always make sure that every browser will produce an identical "Tor Browser" fingerprint and just hoping you account for everything that might go wrong, it seems like the smarter thing to do would be to make sure that every browser (and even every session) used a totally randomized fingerprint. That makes it impossible to track anyone across sites/visits and impossible to even tell the difference between someone using Tor Browser or any other browser that has a unique fingerprint (or randomizes to create one). Most people's browsers are already creating a unique fingerprint, the trick is just to make one person's browser differently unique every time. Every website will see your browser visit them once, but then never again.