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Comparing the 737 max (all variants) to nearly any other passenger transport shows that it is safe and we are seeing why in real time. An issue happened which c

Comparing the 737 max (all variants) to nearly any other passenger transport shows that it is safe and we are seeing why in real time. An issue happened which correctly caused immediate grounding and inspections followed by an in-depth review and likely corrective action both to the issue and the practices that created it. Implying it isn't safe is continuing to feed a false narrative that encourages unreasonable fear of flying and is holding aviation back.

OvbiousError 3y ago
Except if part of the wall goes flying off you mean?
- hedora 3y ago
  Or if the still-not-redundant air speed sensor fails. There’s also the recent report that parts of the tail wing were not properly torqued, and they’re internally falling apart.
  - dghlsakjg 3y ago
    Do you mean the AoA sensor? There have always been at least three airspeed pitots on every 737 model. Also, as of 2022, there are 2 physical sensors and a computed value from alternate sources for AoA on all flying MAX planes
  - NikkiA 3y ago
    The 737 has had an empennage assembly problem since the 737-classics, every few years boeing promises they've tightened QA and it's solved, then it happens again.
- swasheck 3y ago
  it does seem like there's been an uptick in "incidents" involving boeing planes, in particular, and maybe that's because of the fallout of the merger between boeing and md (https://qz.com/1776080/how-the-mcdonnell-douglas-boeing-merger-led-to-the-737-max-crisis/ https://qz.com/1776080/how-the-mcdonnell-douglas-boeing-merg...), and even then i'm not sure if that's _statistically_ accurate. this does not, however, invalidate the CP premise that it's generally safe to fly, even on the Max series and that is largely because this part of the process is working (grounding, checking, remediating) even if the development and manufacturing processes have failed. however, i'll also agree with you that being subject to the effects of iterative improvement is uncomfortable in the air transport context.
turquoisevar 3y ago
I’ve said this before, and I’ll repeat it: yes, flying is statistically safer than other forms of transport to the point that you’re more likely to die on your way to the airport than on a flight. BUT that knowledge shouldn’t be used to become complacent to the point that we let things slip, nor should it be used to ignore other indicators that could signal a negative trend. “And we are seeing why in real time” only plays into that complacency because it suggests that the post-incident acts are the goal, while it used to be that they’re means to a goal, the goal being that they’re not needed in the first place. In particular, with the door plug, the issue is that they go against best practices that have been established yesteryear (i.e., making them bigger than the hole and plugging from the inside to leverage cabin pressure instead of working against cabin pressure) and that’s aside from the knowledge both inside Boeing and supplier Spirit AeroSystem of quality issues. On a macro level, there’s a more considerable erosion of aviation safety at play, however, especially in the US. This erosion has only marginally led to increased deaths (albeit preventable) but has significantly increased the level of near-catastrophic events. This, in my humble opinion, is an essential signal in terms of potential future fatalities. I’m talking about: - things at the manufacturer level, of which Boeing with their 737 MAX fulfills an emblematic role (e.g., MCAS, door plug, loose bolts, etc); - regulators’ lack of proper enforcement (e.g., FAA being extremely hesitant to ground planes after the MCAS incidents, making them one of the last ones to do so, FAA being extremely deferential in the certification process, allowing Boeing to essentially self-certify most of the essential stuff, if not outright granting them waivers or allowing Boeing to omit information about specific systems from flight manuals); - lacks regulation on crew hours, leading to fatigued crew; - overworked and understaffed ATC; - “safe enough” mentality when it comes to protocols at and around airports to increase the number of movements The list goes on and on. The common denominator? Money. It’s cheaper and more expeditious to let Boeing evade proper certification and to let them sell a range of different models under the same type certification. It’s better for the economy not to ground planes made by America’s darling manufacturer. It’s cheaper for American airlines to only count the hours the planes’ doors are closed as work hours and to not be too strict with mandatory rest requirements. It’s cheaper to hire contractors to do ATC and to have one person do a job that would be safer to split amongst 3, especially when it costs more to attract two more people. It’s cheaper to cram more planes onto a runway than to spread them out; it also makes more money for airlines and airports. So it’s better to have pilots do a visual approach and visual separation; not only does this unload some of the responsibility to the pilots, freeing up ATC resources, but it also requires less separation, which means more movements at the airport. This practice has the blessing of the FAA, by the way, this is straight from the FAA Safety Alert For Operators SAFO 21005[0]. IFALPA, in turn, released a bulletin to highlight how the US practice isn’t in line with ICAO practices and to advise non-US pilots on how to handle this[1]. On their own, none of these might immediately lead to a noticeable effect in aviation safety, but combined, they most certainly do. For every incident that makes headlines, ten never make it into mainstream news, which hides the significant uptick in near-catastrophic events[2]. So yes, while statically aviation is a safe mode of transport, it doesn’t help to proclaim that “there’s nothing to see here folks, everything is super safe.” It’s a miracle nobody died in this door plug incident, a straight-up miracle, and not the result of some grand safety design. Any attempt to paint it as other than a miracle is just confirmation bias. 0: https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/SAFO21005_0.pdf https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/SAFO21005_0.pdf 1: https://ops.group/blog/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/21atsbl04-visual-approach-considerations-in-the-usa.pdf https://ops.group/blog/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/21atsbl04-... 2: https://sfist.com/2023/08/21/close-calls-on-sfo-runways-are-just-tip-of-the-iceberg-in-broader-national-trend/ https://sfist.com/2023/08/21/close-calls-on-sfo-runways-are-...

OvbiousError 3y ago

Except if part of the wall goes flying off you mean?

hedora 3y ago
Or if the still-not-redundant air speed sensor fails. There’s also the recent report that parts of the tail wing were not properly torqued, and they’re internally falling apart.
- dghlsakjg 3y ago
  Do you mean the AoA sensor? There have always been at least three airspeed pitots on every 737 model. Also, as of 2022, there are 2 physical sensors and a computed value from alternate sources for AoA on all flying MAX planes
- NikkiA 3y ago
  The 737 has had an empennage assembly problem since the 737-classics, every few years boeing promises they've tightened QA and it's solved, then it happens again.
swasheck 3y ago
it does seem like there's been an uptick in "incidents" involving boeing planes, in particular, and maybe that's because of the fallout of the merger between boeing and md (https://qz.com/1776080/how-the-mcdonnell-douglas-boeing-merger-led-to-the-737-max-crisis/ https://qz.com/1776080/how-the-mcdonnell-douglas-boeing-merg...), and even then i'm not sure if that's _statistically_ accurate. this does not, however, invalidate the CP premise that it's generally safe to fly, even on the Max series and that is largely because this part of the process is working (grounding, checking, remediating) even if the development and manufacturing processes have failed. however, i'll also agree with you that being subject to the effects of iterative improvement is uncomfortable in the air transport context.

turquoisevar 3y ago

I’ve said this before, and I’ll repeat it: yes, flying is statistically safer than other forms of transport to the point that you’re more likely to die on your way to the airport than on a flight. BUT that knowledge shouldn’t be used to become complacent to the point that we let things slip, nor should it be used to ignore other indicators that could signal a negative trend. “And we are seeing why in real time” only plays into that complacency because it suggests that the post-incident acts are the goal, while it used to be that they’re means to a goal, the goal being that they’re not needed in the first place. In particular, with the door plug, the issue is that they go against best practices that have been established yesteryear (i.e., making them bigger than the hole and plugging from the inside to leverage cabin pressure instead of working against cabin pressure) and that’s aside from the knowledge both inside Boeing and supplier Spirit AeroSystem of quality issues. On a macro level, there’s a more considerable erosion of aviation safety at play, however, especially in the US. This erosion has only marginally led to increased deaths (albeit preventable) but has significantly increased the level of near-catastrophic events. This, in my humble opinion, is an essential signal in terms of potential future fatalities. I’m talking about: - things at the manufacturer level, of which Boeing with their 737 MAX fulfills an emblematic role (e.g., MCAS, door plug, loose bolts, etc); - regulators’ lack of proper enforcement (e.g., FAA being extremely hesitant to ground planes after the MCAS incidents, making them one of the last ones to do so, FAA being extremely deferential in the certification process, allowing Boeing to essentially self-certify most of the essential stuff, if not outright granting them waivers or allowing Boeing to omit information about specific systems from flight manuals); - lacks regulation on crew hours, leading to fatigued crew; - overworked and understaffed ATC; - “safe enough” mentality when it comes to protocols at and around airports to increase the number of movements The list goes on and on. The common denominator? Money. It’s cheaper and more expeditious to let Boeing evade proper certification and to let them sell a range of different models under the same type certification. It’s better for the economy not to ground planes made by America’s darling manufacturer. It’s cheaper for American airlines to only count the hours the planes’ doors are closed as work hours and to not be too strict with mandatory rest requirements. It’s cheaper to hire contractors to do ATC and to have one person do a job that would be safer to split amongst 3, especially when it costs more to attract two more people. It’s cheaper to cram more planes onto a runway than to spread them out; it also makes more money for airlines and airports. So it’s better to have pilots do a visual approach and visual separation; not only does this unload some of the responsibility to the pilots, freeing up ATC resources, but it also requires less separation, which means more movements at the airport. This practice has the blessing of the FAA, by the way, this is straight from the FAA Safety Alert For Operators SAFO 21005[0]. IFALPA, in turn, released a bulletin to highlight how the US practice isn’t in line with ICAO practices and to advise non-US pilots on how to handle this[1]. On their own, none of these might immediately lead to a noticeable effect in aviation safety, but combined, they most certainly do. For every incident that makes headlines, ten never make it into mainstream news, which hides the significant uptick in near-catastrophic events[2]. So yes, while statically aviation is a safe mode of transport, it doesn’t help to proclaim that “there’s nothing to see here folks, everything is super safe.” It’s a miracle nobody died in this door plug incident, a straight-up miracle, and not the result of some grand safety design. Any attempt to paint it as other than a miracle is just confirmation bias. 0: https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/SAFO21005_0.pdf https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/SAFO21005_0.pdf 1: https://ops.group/blog/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/21atsbl04-visual-approach-considerations-in-the-usa.pdf https://ops.group/blog/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/21atsbl04-... 2: https://sfist.com/2023/08/21/close-calls-on-sfo-runways-are-just-tip-of-the-iceberg-in-broader-national-trend/ https://sfist.com/2023/08/21/close-calls-on-sfo-runways-are-...