An initiative exists: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Content_Authenticity_Initiative https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Content_Authenticity_Initiativ... But this is

An initiative exists: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Content_Authenticity_Initiative https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Content_Authenticity_Initiativ... But this is essentially the same problem statement as DRM: provide the user with some cryptographic material, yet limit how they can use it and prevent them from just dumping it. Logically, there will always be a hole. Practically, you can make it very annoying to do, beyond the ability of the average consumer [1], but someone will probably manage, and given the scenarios we often talk about (e.g. state-backed disinformation), there will be plenty of resources spent on doing that. The payoff will cover the cost Paradoxically, one could argue that a "95% trustworthy" system could actually do net harm. The higher people's trust builds in it, the greater the fall damage if someone manages to secretly subvert it, and use it on just the right bit of disinfo at the right time (contrasting my footnote about DRM) [1] Hence why claims that DRM is a complete failure miss the point a bit - it's not needed to stop everyone. Perhaps we can crack some given DRM system, but the fact that you even have to download a new program is enough to stop a massive amount of consumers from bothering