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I think a mechanistic universe is not necessarily a computation, so purely physical intelligence is also not necessarily a computation. But I'm not prepared at

by jprete 3y ago

I think a mechanistic universe is not necessarily a computation, so purely physical intelligence is also not necessarily a computation. But I'm not prepared at the moment to go dig up the alternatives to "computation" and "metaphysical process", or to figure out how a deterministic (or even stochastic) process could be uncomputable.

ncallaway 3y ago
> so purely physical intelligence is also not necessarily a computation. We're going to get into semantics pretty quickly, but I would argue that at least purely physical intelligence is a procedure that is capable of being run on a machine that exists in our universe. I would also argue that, such a machine is _at least_ turing complete (since I would think a general intelligence should be capable of emulating a turing machine in the same way that humans are able to do so). I would happily accept that it's possible that being turing complete is a necessary, *but not sufficient* condition for intelligence. That is, I could see a world where intelligence requires some form of hyper-turing machine, that is able to solve some non-turing computable problems. However, I would argue that even if intelligence does require non-turing computable functions, there exists *a* machine which can perform those procedures (that is, we exist). Thus, in this hypothetical universe where intelligence is non-turing computable, we would then have an existence proof for a hyper-turing machine which can compute non-turing computable results. In this universe, then, I'd argue that anything that can be produced by this "hyper-turing machine", _is_ "physically computable", even if not "turing-computable". Ultimately, if we accept the premise of a mechanistic universe, I think humans are an existence proof of a machine capable of producing intelligence. Then, I think it follows that it *cannot* be physically impossible to create a machine capable of producing intelligence. Whether we call that machine a "computer", though, I don't have a strong preference.

by jprete 3y ago

ncallaway 3y ago

> so purely physical intelligence is also not necessarily a computation. We're going to get into semantics pretty quickly, but I would argue that at least purely physical intelligence is a procedure that is capable of being run on a machine that exists in our universe. I would also argue that, such a machine is _at least_ turing complete (since I would think a general intelligence should be capable of emulating a turing machine in the same way that humans are able to do so). I would happily accept that it's possible that being turing complete is a necessary, *but not sufficient* condition for intelligence. That is, I could see a world where intelligence requires some form of hyper-turing machine, that is able to solve some non-turing computable problems. However, I would argue that even if intelligence does require non-turing computable functions, there exists *a* machine which can perform those procedures (that is, we exist). Thus, in this hypothetical universe where intelligence is non-turing computable, we would then have an existence proof for a hyper-turing machine which can compute non-turing computable results. In this universe, then, I'd argue that anything that can be produced by this "hyper-turing machine", _is_ "physically computable", even if not "turing-computable". Ultimately, if we accept the premise of a mechanistic universe, I think humans are an existence proof of a machine capable of producing intelligence. Then, I think it follows that it *cannot* be physically impossible to create a machine capable of producing intelligence. Whether we call that machine a "computer", though, I don't have a strong preference.