3 ms·

A scenario worth considering before deciding for yourself if Chevron being overturned is entirely bad news: If a would be dictator were elected in the United St

by w4 3y ago

A scenario worth considering before deciding for yourself if Chevron being overturned is entirely bad news: If a would be dictator were elected in the United States, would it be better if the courts had broad power to check the executive branch's actions, or would it be better if the courts' power of review was very limited in scope? The independent agencies hold incredible powers over American private and economic life[1]. Under the doctrine of Chevron deference, the courts have very limited authority to review the independent agencies' actions. These actions include the exercise of judicial power (via their administrative courts[2]) and de facto legislative power (via their regulatory authorities[3]). These agencies are housed in the executive branch. There is an argument to be made that the president has full authority and control of the executive[4]. Therefore, it is currently very possible for the president to argue that they have vast legally permitted powers. Or, even more simply, the president could nominate loyalists to oversee the agencies who will follow their instructions, effectuating the same outcome even if the legal argument fails. Overturning Chevron would limit the danger presented by these scenarios by giving the courts greater power to review and overturn the agencies' actions. It's something to seriously think about when considering whether or not Chevron deference is a good idea. Chevron Deference is also a comparatively new concept (1984[5]), and is much younger than the agencies themselves (many established starting during the New Deal in the 1930s[6]). Personally, I would suggest that it is generally unwise to leave toys for would be autocrats to play with laying around, even when you have noble goals in mind. And if that's right, overturning Chevron might not be such a bad thing, particularly in the unstable times we find ourselves in, even if it has some undesirable effects. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independent_agencies_of_the_United_States_government#Examples_of_independent_agencies https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independent_agencies_of_the_Un... [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Administrative_law_judge https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Administrative_law_judge [3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rulemaking https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rulemaking [4] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unitary_executive_theory https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unitary_executive_theory [5] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chevron_U.S.A.%2C_Inc._v._Natural_Resources_Defense_Council%2C_Inc https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chevron_U.S.A.%2C_Inc._v._Natu.... [6] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independent_agencies_of_the_United_States_government https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independent_agencies_of_the_Un...

threatofrain 3y ago
I'd pose the question as whether legislature has the power to be deliberately vague with the intent of allowing the executive branch to fill in the details.
- w4 3y ago
  That’s not really the question being decided about Chevron, though. That’s a much bigger question about the constitutionality of the independent agencies themselves. The question at hand in this case is basically whether or not the judiciary should, and can, exercise its power of review over the actions of these agencies. Right now the Supreme Court has said, in Chevron, that it should not and that lower courts cannot. This may well change in this current case.
  - threatofrain 3y ago
    From my reading, part of Chevron was about whether Congress had delegated authority to an agency. > When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency's policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail. > The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress. If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation.
    - w4 3y ago
      Sort of. My understanding is that courts very much have the power to knock down agencies acting outside of their legislative authority, even under Chevron. That’s not what the debate about Chevron is about. The debate around Chevron is about the deference that the courts have decided they must give to actions taken by the agencies which are a “reasonable” reading of their enabling statutes. In practice this means that the courts cannot review the vast majority of the actions of agencies, unless those actions are outrageous oversteps of the authority they were granted by Congress.

by w4 3y ago

threatofrain 3y ago

I'd pose the question as whether legislature has the power to be deliberately vague with the intent of allowing the executive branch to fill in the details.

w4 3y ago
That’s not really the question being decided about Chevron, though. That’s a much bigger question about the constitutionality of the independent agencies themselves. The question at hand in this case is basically whether or not the judiciary should, and can, exercise its power of review over the actions of these agencies. Right now the Supreme Court has said, in Chevron, that it should not and that lower courts cannot. This may well change in this current case.
- threatofrain 3y ago
  From my reading, part of Chevron was about whether Congress had delegated authority to an agency. > When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency's policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail. > The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress. If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation.
  - w4 3y ago
    Sort of. My understanding is that courts very much have the power to knock down agencies acting outside of their legislative authority, even under Chevron. That’s not what the debate about Chevron is about. The debate around Chevron is about the deference that the courts have decided they must give to actions taken by the agencies which are a “reasonable” reading of their enabling statutes. In practice this means that the courts cannot review the vast majority of the actions of agencies, unless those actions are outrageous oversteps of the authority they were granted by Congress.