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I imagine all the media attention is due to the door plug fiasco with everyone piling onto any news about Boeing aircraft (even if it's not really even worth ta

I imagine all the media attention is due to the door plug fiasco with everyone piling onto any news about Boeing aircraft (even if it's not really even worth talking about). It's a shame that the MAX tarnished the 737's history of reliability.

SOLAR_FIELDS 3y ago
Kind of Boeing’s own fault about that though, isn’t it? Presumably they attached MAX to the existing 737 line for several reasons, one of which probably was its history of reliability being a good selling point.
Libcat99 3y ago
A shame for who? Boeing had the option of not destroying their reputation and chose to do so in exchange for a few good quarters.
pirate787 3y ago
It's a shame Boeing killed 346 people. IT's obvious that Boeing is a bad actor. https://www.cnn.com/2022/10/22/business/boeing-737-max-crime-victims/index.html https://www.cnn.com/2022/10/22/business/boeing-737-max-crime...
- foofie 3y ago
  > It's a shame Boeing killed 346 people. IT's obvious that Boeing is a bad actor. If I recall correctly, Boeing also tried to pin the blame of their broken by design plane crashing on human error, when pilots were powerless. Bad actor indeed.
  - sokoloff 3y ago
    Boeing did a lot wrong on the MCAS system. The pilots were, however, not entirely powerless (and Boeing relied too heavily on this fact in their design, I suspect). The 737 memory items include the memory items for a stabilizer trim runaway (which an MCAS malfunction presents as). Every pilot with a 737 type rating had to memorize and recite those memory items. The Ethiopian 302 crew came incredibly close to saving their aircraft by virtue of correctly executing that checklist, leaving themselves with an airplane that was heavily out of trim but probably recoverable. They flew in this configuration for 2m33s (what the final report calls "Phase 4"). In the course of stabilizing and recovering the airplane, they (knowingly) reversed the checklist actions they used to save the plane initially (entering Phase 5), in conjunction with commanding aircraft-nose-up (ANU) trim manually, then for unknowable reasons (perhaps simple human overload), left the stab trim powered up and stopped commanding ANU trim, at which point the underlying MCAS fault drove the airplane to the crash. It was possible to save the flight and the crew struggled valiantly and almost achieved that save. The pilots were placed in a very difficult situation, but they were not powerless. It's a terrible look for Boeing to point that out, especially in the manner and tone they did. * - https://bea.aero/fileadmin/user_upload/ET_302__B737-8MAX_ACCIDENT_FINAL_REPORT.pdf https://bea.aero/fileadmin/user_upload/ET_302__B737-8MAX_ACC...

SOLAR_FIELDS 3y ago

Kind of Boeing’s own fault about that though, isn’t it? Presumably they attached MAX to the existing 737 line for several reasons, one of which probably was its history of reliability being a good selling point.

Libcat99 3y ago

A shame for who? Boeing had the option of not destroying their reputation and chose to do so in exchange for a few good quarters.

pirate787 3y ago

It's a shame Boeing killed 346 people. IT's obvious that Boeing is a bad actor. https://www.cnn.com/2022/10/22/business/boeing-737-max-crime-victims/index.html https://www.cnn.com/2022/10/22/business/boeing-737-max-crime...

foofie 3y ago
> It's a shame Boeing killed 346 people. IT's obvious that Boeing is a bad actor. If I recall correctly, Boeing also tried to pin the blame of their broken by design plane crashing on human error, when pilots were powerless. Bad actor indeed.
- sokoloff 3y ago
  Boeing did a lot wrong on the MCAS system. The pilots were, however, not entirely powerless (and Boeing relied too heavily on this fact in their design, I suspect). The 737 memory items include the memory items for a stabilizer trim runaway (which an MCAS malfunction presents as). Every pilot with a 737 type rating had to memorize and recite those memory items. The Ethiopian 302 crew came incredibly close to saving their aircraft by virtue of correctly executing that checklist, leaving themselves with an airplane that was heavily out of trim but probably recoverable. They flew in this configuration for 2m33s (what the final report calls "Phase 4"). In the course of stabilizing and recovering the airplane, they (knowingly) reversed the checklist actions they used to save the plane initially (entering Phase 5), in conjunction with commanding aircraft-nose-up (ANU) trim manually, then for unknowable reasons (perhaps simple human overload), left the stab trim powered up and stopped commanding ANU trim, at which point the underlying MCAS fault drove the airplane to the crash. It was possible to save the flight and the crew struggled valiantly and almost achieved that save. The pilots were placed in a very difficult situation, but they were not powerless. It's a terrible look for Boeing to point that out, especially in the manner and tone they did. * - https://bea.aero/fileadmin/user_upload/ET_302__B737-8MAX_ACCIDENT_FINAL_REPORT.pdf https://bea.aero/fileadmin/user_upload/ET_302__B737-8MAX_ACC...