If we take theory to be a kind of language about a domain, a kind of logos, then in that sense, because observation is theory-laden, observation can likely be u

If we take theory to be a kind of language about a domain, a kind of logos, then in that sense, because observation is theory-laden, observation can likely be understood as language-laden. According to that view, then yes, obviously, language affects how we interpret observation. Interpretation fills in gaps and relates prior beliefs with the observation. Two people with different priors can interpret the same observation in two different ways. (Which is not to suggest relativism. We can indeed speak of having better or worse priors, just as we can speak of lesser or greater expertise.) Language also allows us to express finer distinctions. It is not that distinctions are not perceived otherwise. That would be absurd. How could you ever develop the vocabulary to make finer distinctions if you wouldn't perceive them in the first place? Rather, it makes it possible to speak about them with greater precision, and speech can reinforce discernment through a kind of process of affirmation. When speech reaffirms a belief, it is more durable. It stands a better chance of withstanding the potentially hostile churn of psychological and social forces. Hence, why naming something, accurately, and with the appropriate precision, is such a powerful act.