4 ms·
> These "need" privileges to upload the resulting artifacts somewhere. Only because pypi removed support for gpg and their only "signature" now basically is "w
by LtWorf 3y ago
> These "need" privileges to upload the resulting artifacts somewhere.
Only because pypi removed support for gpg and their only "signature" now basically is "was uploaded from a gh action".
Otherwise a maintainer could do it offline without needing to give microsoft total access to uploading to pypi.
- Bognar 3y agoIf you're using GHA to publish then you still need a trusted branch to provide secrets to. If you're not publishing using CI, then you can still upload to PyPI manually with an API Token. > without needing to give microsoft total access to uploading to pypi I assume you're referring to Trusted Publishers here? It's a per-project configuration using the industry standard of OIDC that you don't have to opt in to, so "total access" is a silly characterization. Also if you're insinuating that MS is going to generate fraudulent OIDC tokens to compromise a PyPI package, then you might want to start weaning yourself off the kool-aid.
- LtWorf 3y ago> If you're using GHA to publish then you still need a trusted branch to provide secrets to The vulnerability was exactly that the secrets of the trusted branch can get leaked :) > you can still upload to PyPI manually with an API Token I can, BUT if you want to be a Trusted Publisher™ the only way is to do it via github. https://docs.pypi.org/trusted-publishers/ https://docs.pypi.org/trusted-publishers/ Most likely the plan is to make it compulsory for all projects eventually, just like they made 2fa compulsory. So less secure is considered as MORE secure by pypi :) Which is consistent with the idea that no PGP signature is more secure than signed uploads. Or the idea that a global token in a clear text file is somehow safer than a password that gets typed every time.