From https://jacobin.com/2024/01/boeing-malfunction-ceo-pay-stock-buybacks/ https://jacobin.com/2024/01/boeing-malfunction-ceo-pay-stock...: This pressure to p

From https://jacobin.com/2024/01/boeing-malfunction-ceo-pay-stock-buybacks/ https://jacobin.com/2024/01/boeing-malfunction-ceo-pay-stock...: This pressure to prioritize profits over quality was felt throughout Boeing’s supply chain, including at its offshoot, Spirit. Mustafa Erdem Sakinç, an economist who studied Boeing’s corporate strategies, told us in an email, “Cost-cutting was the single major reason behind selling commercial aircraft-parts operations to . . . the new entity named Spirit Aerosystems.” Sakinç explained that “Spirit AeroSystems introduced its own cost-cutting strategy, even harsher than Boeing’s,” largely centered around cutting labor costs. "Boeing took advantage of Spirit’s weaker union and more cutthroat business tactics by further squeezing their supplier to do faster, cheaper work." In a 2007 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filing, two years after they were founded, Spirit executives explained that they “hired 1,300 fewer people than the predecessor had employed” and implemented less favorable union contracts which “provided for wage reductions of 10%,” among other profit-motivated measures. Sorscher explained that Boeing took advantage of Spirit’s weaker union and more cutthroat business tactics by further squeezing their supplier to do faster, cheaper work. “You couldn’t screw over your own employees like you could screw over your supplier’s employees,” Sorscher said. In a federal securities lawsuit that we reported on Monday, some of Spirit’s former employees alleged that production defects came from Spirit’s “failure to hire sufficient personnel to deliver quality products at the rates demanded by Spirit and its customers including Boeing.” The suit identified many serious production issues including “out-of-calibration torque wrenches” that mechanics were using, and “defects such as the routine presence of foreign object debris (‘FOD’) in Spirit products, missing fasteners, peeling paint, and poor skin quality.” The complaint concluded that “such constant quality failures resulted in part from Spirit’s culture which prioritized production numbers and short-term financial outcomes over product quality.” Boeing may attempt to distance itself from Spirit in the wake of recent revelations. When asked previously about the lawsuit, Boeing spokesperson David Sidman told us, “We defer to Spirit for any comment.” But the two companies remain closely intertwined. According to Spirit’s SEC filings from 2022, the company’s “business depends largely on sales of components for a single aircraft program, the B737.” Sixty percent of Spirit’s revenue that year came from Boeing, according to the company’s annual report. Spirit’s new CEO Patrick Shanahan also previously worked at Boeing for more than thirty years, and Spirit’s senior vice president Terry George previously served as Boeing’s manager on the 737 program.