4 ms·
I wonder how easy it would be to memorize all of the tables, so you wouldn't even need to rely on the pieces of paper as a possible point of attack. (Fallible m
by nxobject 3y ago
I wonder how easy it would be to memorize all of the tables, so you wouldn't even need to rely on the pieces of paper as a possible point of attack. (Fallible memory allowing, of course...)
The other question is: would there be any weaknesses if I used this scheme multiple times to encode a longer message – for example, a 48-long passphrase?
- Sjlver 3y agoThe tables are public knowledge. Memorizing them does not give you any extra security. It might hide the fact that you are using psst. This might make you less of a target for attacks (but probably has a very small or zero effect). It also increases the chance that your secret is lost, for example when your shares are accidentally thrown in the trash because they look like random pieces of paper. For your other question: There is no weakness when using psst for long messages. That said, weaknesses can be introduced if you don't follow the protocol properly. For example, if you use the same dice throws for more than one psst instance, the system is no longer secure. This page has further examples for things that could go wrong: https://github.com/Sjlver/psst/blob/main/docs/what-can-go-wrong.md#not-enough-randomness https://github.com/Sjlver/psst/blob/main/docs/what-can-go-wr... It can give you a feeling for what kind of use is safe vs unsafe.