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Thats interesting thanks. re: Riposte: I found some old pages about it on the wayback machine https://web.archive.org/web/20000706232447/http://www.eschergroup

Thats interesting thanks. re: Riposte: I found some old pages about it on the wayback machine https://web.archive.org/web/20000706232447/http://www.eschergroup.com/index-prod.html https://web.archive.org/web/20000706232447/http://www.escher... "Any fear of complete local failure is alleviated by the fact that each workstation can recover from a central location." And also, er ... "Riposte protects against fraud by providing a clear and complete audit trail for every transaction."

tauchunfall 3y ago
Reading the Riposte page from your Wayback Machine link it seems Eschergroup gave Fujitsu UK the hardware concept with redundant workstations, and Fujitsu extended it for the data integrity concept of their application [1] ("2 Horizon Data Integrity", page 6). The concept looks really nice on paper, also the network communication considerations [2]. But there were bugs in Horizon like when a notebook at a post office was shutdown before a certain time, there were no day-end-markers added to the last transaction, and it seems they had no concept to let the system check this on the next day. There were bugs where the start times for transactions where missing, and these transactions were filtered in certain views however these messages eventually were transmitted. [1] FUJ00080526 - Fujitsu Report Horizon Data Integrity v1.0, https://www.postofficehorizoninquiry.org.uk/evidence/fuj00080526-fujitsu-report-horizon-data-integrity-v10 https://www.postofficehorizoninquiry.org.uk/evidence/fuj0008... [2] WITN00780100 - Richard Roll - Witness Statement.pdf >[...]there were several different types of configuration, depending on the type of PO (mobile, single counter, multi counter or main PO with a separate gateway computer), but from the SPM's perspective these would have all looked the same. >General security protocols were in place at the PO's. Secure passwords were required, which were not supposed to be shared but often were. There was a secure link from the PO counter to Fujitsu's servers —the counters would only respond to requests originating from specific telephone numbers —and all data was encrypted. Additionally, the network was completely (logically) isolated form the internet, it had its own dedicated lines[...]
- codeulike 3y ago
  Thanks. While we're talking about this here's a few other things I've found: Computerphile video from 2 years ago about the bugs: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hBJm9ZYqL10 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hBJm9ZYqL10 Fujitsu casestudy PR document from 2004, still on their website! with a bit of high level info and bumf about the system. Has a few photos of the hardware. https://www.fujitsu.com/downloads/SVC/fs/casestudies/uk-postoffice2.pdf https://www.fujitsu.com/downloads/SVC/fs/casestudies/uk-post... This system audit manual from Jan 2000 looks like it has a lot of detail but I havent had the chance to read it yet https://www.postofficehorizoninquiry.org.uk/evidence/pol00029165-icl-pathway-horizon-system-audit-manual-csr-v13 https://www.postofficehorizoninquiry.org.uk/evidence/pol0002...

tauchunfall 3y ago

Reading the Riposte page from your Wayback Machine link it seems Eschergroup gave Fujitsu UK the hardware concept with redundant workstations, and Fujitsu extended it for the data integrity concept of their application [1] ("2 Horizon Data Integrity", page 6). The concept looks really nice on paper, also the network communication considerations [2]. But there were bugs in Horizon like when a notebook at a post office was shutdown before a certain time, there were no day-end-markers added to the last transaction, and it seems they had no concept to let the system check this on the next day. There were bugs where the start times for transactions where missing, and these transactions were filtered in certain views however these messages eventually were transmitted. [1] FUJ00080526 - Fujitsu Report Horizon Data Integrity v1.0, https://www.postofficehorizoninquiry.org.uk/evidence/fuj00080526-fujitsu-report-horizon-data-integrity-v10 https://www.postofficehorizoninquiry.org.uk/evidence/fuj0008... [2] WITN00780100 - Richard Roll - Witness Statement.pdf >[...]there were several different types of configuration, depending on the type of PO (mobile, single counter, multi counter or main PO with a separate gateway computer), but from the SPM's perspective these would have all looked the same. >General security protocols were in place at the PO's. Secure passwords were required, which were not supposed to be shared but often were. There was a secure link from the PO counter to Fujitsu's servers —the counters would only respond to requests originating from specific telephone numbers —and all data was encrypted. Additionally, the network was completely (logically) isolated form the internet, it had its own dedicated lines[...]

codeulike 3y ago
Thanks. While we're talking about this here's a few other things I've found: Computerphile video from 2 years ago about the bugs: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hBJm9ZYqL10 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hBJm9ZYqL10 Fujitsu casestudy PR document from 2004, still on their website! with a bit of high level info and bumf about the system. Has a few photos of the hardware. https://www.fujitsu.com/downloads/SVC/fs/casestudies/uk-postoffice2.pdf https://www.fujitsu.com/downloads/SVC/fs/casestudies/uk-post... This system audit manual from Jan 2000 looks like it has a lot of detail but I havent had the chance to read it yet https://www.postofficehorizoninquiry.org.uk/evidence/pol00029165-icl-pathway-horizon-system-audit-manual-csr-v13 https://www.postofficehorizoninquiry.org.uk/evidence/pol0002...