2 ms·

Keep in mind that about half the cost is the transmission line. [1] Vogtle closely matches nuclear costs in Europe so trying to frame it as a special snowflake

Keep in mind that about half the cost is the transmission line. [1] Vogtle closely matches nuclear costs in Europe so trying to frame it as a special snowflake we will never repeat does not add up. Until proven otherwise it is what nuclear construction is expected to cost in advanced economies. Bent Flyvbjerg has studied megaprojects. Looking at those the most likely to come in on time and budget are solar pv and wind projects. On the complete opposite end of the spectrum we have nuclear energy only beaten by the Olympics and nuclear waste storage in terms of cost over runs and delays. The HVDC line adds risk but we have gotten quite experienced at building those globally. The equivalency in risk you try to construct does not exist. https://patternenergy.com/pattern-energy-closes-11-billion-financing-of-largest-clean-energy-infrastructure-project-in-u-s-history/ https://patternenergy.com/pattern-energy-closes-11-billion-f...

AnthonyMouse 3y ago
> Keep in mind that about half the cost is the transmission line. The main cost of a transmission line is the land. This is a good synergy when it's available but you can't just subtract the cost of the transmission line if you want to know how much the generation costs to build anywhere there isn't a transmission line because you'd still need to pay for the land. > Vogtle closely matches nuclear costs in Europe so trying to frame it as a special snowflake we will never repeat does not add up. Western Europe has only brought one reactor online in the last 15 years, resulting in the same kind of issues as Vogtle. Problems caused by not building enough of something can be solved by building more of them, which makes that a poor justification for not building more of them. > Bent Flyvbjerg has studied megaprojects. "The Iron Law of Megaprojets: Over budget, over time, over and over again." -Bent Flyvbjerg Claiming that the estimates are more often wrong for nuclear reactors doesn't help you when you're already comparing the actual finished cost of the nuclear reactor to the estimate for the wind project.
- ViewTrick1002 3y ago
  Lets just keep the blinders on and ignore the other projects in Europe: - Flamanville: Construction start 2007. Hopefully finished 2024. Five times over budget - Hinkley Point C: Political decision and construction start 2008. Investment decision 2013. Hopefully done by 2028, costs spiraling. n:th of a kind reactor. - Olkiluoto 3: Construction start 2005. Done 2023. - Hanhikivi: Never passed the phase when they tried to certify a Russian reactor for western safety requirements. The problem with nuclear is the Baumol Effect [1]. The construction industry has barely become more efficient while labor costs has increased. Thus magically investing another trillion dollars in subsidies for nuclear is not certain to meaningfully make it cheaper. We have already had one massive round of subsidies, those didn't pan out. France famously experience negative learning by doing in their nuclear program. [2] Given the outcome of previous wind projects it is almost certain that it will be on time and on budget. [1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baumol_effect https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baumol_effect [2]: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0301421510003526 https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S03014...
  - AnthonyMouse 3y ago
    > Hanhikivi: Never passed the phase when they tried to certify a Russian reactor for western safety requirements. Hardly an opportunity to learn how to build reactors efficiently when they didn't build anything. > Olkiluoto 3: Construction start 2005. Done 2023. This isn't "other projects", it's the one they brought online in the last 15 years. > Flamanville: Construction start 2007. Hopefully finished 2024. Five times over budget > Hinkley Point C: Political decision and construction start 2008. Investment decision 2013. Hopefully done by 2028, costs spiraling. n:th of a kind reactor. The newest of these was started only 3 years after Olkiluoto 3 and 15 years before it came online. The premise is that you can learn from past efforts, not that you can't make the same mistake concurrently in parallel projects. These are also each in a different country with a different regulator. > The problem with nuclear is the Baumol Effect > France famously experience negative learning by doing in their nuclear program. The Baumol effect would explain the negative learning, but then that isn't anything unique to constructing nuclear reactors. The cost of constructing wind farms or natural gas plants would be equally affected. So something else is going on here, and the something else has a cause that can be analyzed and addressed. If it was possible to do it in 1975 then it should be possible to do it now.
    - ViewTrick1002 3y ago
      The final investment decision came in 2017. Saying that they didn't learn anything from the 12 years in between is horrifying. Even worse is calling it acceptable to make nuclear sound feasible. Massive subventions made it possible in the 70s. What was sold never matched reality. It is easy to see what happens when humanity finds an energy source cheaper than fossil fuels. We've dammed up almost every single river globally. Nuclear energy never became cheaper. Today we have found a new power source that is cheaper than fossil fuels. Renewables. Which barely have an geographical limitations. We are in for a ride as Jevons Paradox plays out its course. - CCGT plants take advantage of scale from the airline industry. - Coal is dead. - Wind turbines are productized with only the foundations being true construction. Nuclear is attempting to be a more expensive coal in 2024.
      - 3y ago
pyrale 3y ago
> Vogtle closely matches nuclear costs in Europe Why not compare it to Vogtle 1-2, which cost about half? It seems obvious that if equivalent reactors built at the same location cost twice the price, there has to be an explanation besides the technology.
- mikeyouse 3y ago
  Vogtle 1 & 2 started construction almost 50 years ago and were a completely different reactor design. The DOE looked at 3 & 4 and found the following sources of delay / cost overrun: > 1. Rework / remediation – Rework was a significant source of project delay for many years. Known test failure rates of components have ranged from 40–80% over different time periods. Many of the tested components did not function properly and required corrective action to function as designed. > 2. Supply chain delays – Poor module-delivery performance was a result of a few factors. Some of the designs sent to fabricators were incomplete and changed after fabricators started. In some cases, it was unrealistic to construct the modules as designed. In other instances, the required quality-assurance paperwork was lacking, so modules could not be shipped. Finally, site management eventually gave up on the module fabricator, and the modules were shipped incomplete for finishing on location. 3. Low productivity – Tasks often took longer than estimated—even before rework—due to acute shortages in key trades. This shortage (1) necessitated the hiring of an inexperienced workforce, (2) resulted in poor management that delivered inadequate directions and improper scheduling, and (3) resulted in difficult-to-construct design (e.g., high levels of workspace congestion from a small plant footprint). 4. Attrition / absenteeism – labor has been unavailable when needed, and attrition hindered learning COVID-19 caused a much higher than normal rate of absenteeism—as many as 2,800 positive cases by December 2021—impacting all workstreams. This absenteeism was compounded by attrition. For example, there was a 50% attrition rate on electricians from Unit 3 to Unit 4. Because labor projections factored-in a positive learning rate from Unit 3 to Unit 4, these high levels of attrition caused these projections to be inaccurate. Not exactly inspiring, or easily solvable. https://liftoff.energy.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/20230320-Liftoff-Advanced-Nuclear-vPUB.pdf https://liftoff.energy.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/202303...
  - AnthonyMouse 3y ago

AnthonyMouse 3y ago

> Keep in mind that about half the cost is the transmission line. The main cost of a transmission line is the land. This is a good synergy when it's available but you can't just subtract the cost of the transmission line if you want to know how much the generation costs to build anywhere there isn't a transmission line because you'd still need to pay for the land. > Vogtle closely matches nuclear costs in Europe so trying to frame it as a special snowflake we will never repeat does not add up. Western Europe has only brought one reactor online in the last 15 years, resulting in the same kind of issues as Vogtle. Problems caused by not building enough of something can be solved by building more of them, which makes that a poor justification for not building more of them. > Bent Flyvbjerg has studied megaprojects. "The Iron Law of Megaprojets: Over budget, over time, over and over again." -Bent Flyvbjerg Claiming that the estimates are more often wrong for nuclear reactors doesn't help you when you're already comparing the actual finished cost of the nuclear reactor to the estimate for the wind project.

ViewTrick1002 3y ago
Lets just keep the blinders on and ignore the other projects in Europe: - Flamanville: Construction start 2007. Hopefully finished 2024. Five times over budget - Hinkley Point C: Political decision and construction start 2008. Investment decision 2013. Hopefully done by 2028, costs spiraling. n:th of a kind reactor. - Olkiluoto 3: Construction start 2005. Done 2023. - Hanhikivi: Never passed the phase when they tried to certify a Russian reactor for western safety requirements. The problem with nuclear is the Baumol Effect [1]. The construction industry has barely become more efficient while labor costs has increased. Thus magically investing another trillion dollars in subsidies for nuclear is not certain to meaningfully make it cheaper. We have already had one massive round of subsidies, those didn't pan out. France famously experience negative learning by doing in their nuclear program. [2] Given the outcome of previous wind projects it is almost certain that it will be on time and on budget. [1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baumol_effect https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baumol_effect [2]: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0301421510003526 https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S03014...
- AnthonyMouse 3y ago
  > Hanhikivi: Never passed the phase when they tried to certify a Russian reactor for western safety requirements. Hardly an opportunity to learn how to build reactors efficiently when they didn't build anything. > Olkiluoto 3: Construction start 2005. Done 2023. This isn't "other projects", it's the one they brought online in the last 15 years. > Flamanville: Construction start 2007. Hopefully finished 2024. Five times over budget > Hinkley Point C: Political decision and construction start 2008. Investment decision 2013. Hopefully done by 2028, costs spiraling. n:th of a kind reactor. The newest of these was started only 3 years after Olkiluoto 3 and 15 years before it came online. The premise is that you can learn from past efforts, not that you can't make the same mistake concurrently in parallel projects. These are also each in a different country with a different regulator. > The problem with nuclear is the Baumol Effect > France famously experience negative learning by doing in their nuclear program. The Baumol effect would explain the negative learning, but then that isn't anything unique to constructing nuclear reactors. The cost of constructing wind farms or natural gas plants would be equally affected. So something else is going on here, and the something else has a cause that can be analyzed and addressed. If it was possible to do it in 1975 then it should be possible to do it now.
  - ViewTrick1002 3y ago
    The final investment decision came in 2017. Saying that they didn't learn anything from the 12 years in between is horrifying. Even worse is calling it acceptable to make nuclear sound feasible. Massive subventions made it possible in the 70s. What was sold never matched reality. It is easy to see what happens when humanity finds an energy source cheaper than fossil fuels. We've dammed up almost every single river globally. Nuclear energy never became cheaper. Today we have found a new power source that is cheaper than fossil fuels. Renewables. Which barely have an geographical limitations. We are in for a ride as Jevons Paradox plays out its course. - CCGT plants take advantage of scale from the airline industry. - Coal is dead. - Wind turbines are productized with only the foundations being true construction. Nuclear is attempting to be a more expensive coal in 2024.
    - 3y ago

pyrale 3y ago

> Vogtle closely matches nuclear costs in Europe Why not compare it to Vogtle 1-2, which cost about half? It seems obvious that if equivalent reactors built at the same location cost twice the price, there has to be an explanation besides the technology.

mikeyouse 3y ago
Vogtle 1 & 2 started construction almost 50 years ago and were a completely different reactor design. The DOE looked at 3 & 4 and found the following sources of delay / cost overrun: > 1. Rework / remediation – Rework was a significant source of project delay for many years. Known test failure rates of components have ranged from 40–80% over different time periods. Many of the tested components did not function properly and required corrective action to function as designed. > 2. Supply chain delays – Poor module-delivery performance was a result of a few factors. Some of the designs sent to fabricators were incomplete and changed after fabricators started. In some cases, it was unrealistic to construct the modules as designed. In other instances, the required quality-assurance paperwork was lacking, so modules could not be shipped. Finally, site management eventually gave up on the module fabricator, and the modules were shipped incomplete for finishing on location. 3. Low productivity – Tasks often took longer than estimated—even before rework—due to acute shortages in key trades. This shortage (1) necessitated the hiring of an inexperienced workforce, (2) resulted in poor management that delivered inadequate directions and improper scheduling, and (3) resulted in difficult-to-construct design (e.g., high levels of workspace congestion from a small plant footprint). 4. Attrition / absenteeism – labor has been unavailable when needed, and attrition hindered learning COVID-19 caused a much higher than normal rate of absenteeism—as many as 2,800 positive cases by December 2021—impacting all workstreams. This absenteeism was compounded by attrition. For example, there was a 50% attrition rate on electricians from Unit 3 to Unit 4. Because labor projections factored-in a positive learning rate from Unit 3 to Unit 4, these high levels of attrition caused these projections to be inaccurate. Not exactly inspiring, or easily solvable. https://liftoff.energy.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/20230320-Liftoff-Advanced-Nuclear-vPUB.pdf https://liftoff.energy.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/202303...
- AnthonyMouse 3y ago