Ed Pierson, a former senior manager at the 737 Max factory in Renton, WA, indicated there have been 20 quality/airworthiness issues post-MCAS to date prior to t

Ed Pierson, a former senior manager at the 737 Max factory in Renton, WA, indicated there have been 20 quality/airworthiness issues post-MCAS to date prior to this latest incident that have gone largely unnoticed by the mainstream media. It's also worth noting that other ex-employees of Boeing have also raised concerns about substandard structural components made by Ducommun and Boeing's own manufacturing processes for the 737 NG (737-600 to -900). There is no way to know which ones are defective because an unknown number of these critical parts were manufactured inconsistently and haphazardly by hand when they were supposed to be CNC'ed and Boeing just slapped them in without much care. The net result is an average Boeing 737 NG is variably structurally weaker than previous models, and prone to fuselage breakup on hard landings, runway overruns, and possibly in-flight during extreme turbulence. Level 2 corrosion on structural components only 8 years old is what happens when nonconforming, trash parts are passed off as "conforming". Around 2009, the DOJ made a false statement that the NTSB said the NTSB concluded structural components were "not responsible" for AA 331. These were absolute lies drafted by Boeing's lawyer, Mr. Cole, as no conclusion had been yet reached. In a subsequent sworn video statement, the DOJ official admits they spoke Boeing's words largely verbatim. This is what happens when publicly-traded corporations are run by MBAs who gut a company's core competencies for short-term profits and are allowed to largely regulate themselves as a consequent of regulatory capture and the corrosive influence of elected officials who accept "campaign support" and gold bars.