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The conflict is actually not far from being constrained by production, which is difficult to scale up for a 3mm$ munition, because private contractors expect le

The conflict is actually not far from being constrained by production, which is difficult to scale up for a 3mm$ munition, because private contractors expect lengthy contracts to justify long term amortization of increased capital expenditure. Given that Iran is producing thousands to tens of thousands of these missiles every year, and is looking to expand production even more, there actually really is a risk that the stockpiles will not keep up, after which dozens of billions of dollars will have to be expended to seriously ramp up production. This dynamic is also the reason why it's been so difficult to ramp up artillery production in support of Ukraine. Additionally, given that the expensive parts in these drones seem to be homemade in Iran (engines, fuselage, even some of the electronics), and given the sanctions, USD equiv. GDP isn't a great metric since there's no free market to convert Iranian production to USD. Then there's the problem that these missiles are sorely needed in case of a war in China, so actually going through a significant expenditure, even if money is allocated to increase production in 2-3 years, means that the US Navy may find itself with insufficient stockpiles to defend itself against the PLA, should the need arise. Its' ability to defend against credible Chinese saturation attacks is already marginal.

JumpCrisscross 3y ago
> conflict is actually not far from being constrained by production If anyone is talking about escalation risk, production isn’t the bottleneck. We are nowhere close to being resource constrained in the Middle East. > the US Navy may find itself with insufficient stockpiles to defend itself against the PLA In a production contest it’s maximum sustainable flows, not stocks, that matter. (Stocks buy you time to get flows up.) To the extent challenging the PLA is a concern, boosting production to counter the Houthis is a net win. > ability to defend against credible Chinese saturation attacks is already marginal You’re arguing both ways. If their value is marginal, expending them now is fine. Your broader point—I think—is correct. America doesn’t want to spread itself thin. But that’s a constraint at the CVN level. Once the carrier strike force is positioned, it’s immaterial whether it’s firing off missiles or guns. Anyone positioning Iran et al v America et al is missing key pieces in the logistics of war.
- sudosysgen 3y ago
  The stocks are not sufficient to buy time to get the flows. There are only around 500 SM-6 missiles (long range, suitable to protect large numbers of vessels at various distances, 5mm$ each), and there is only capacity to produce a few hundred for the short to medium term. The older SM-2s may have more plentiful stocks, but most of them have been deemed too dangerous to use after causing serious damage in test firings, and there are only around 180 modernized versions available, and the missile itself is no longer produced. Defending against a saturation attack means that the value experiences a step function. Either you have enough missiles to stop most low-tech enemy missiles, and you're going to be largely fine, or you don't, and your entire fleet might sink. It's not something you can afford to. The US Navy is never going to allow stocks to go under what is necessary to stop at least a long-range Chinese attack, and that means at least 600 missiles, which is a serious chunk of what remains. Boosting production to counter the Houthis is surely something the US will do. It will take 2-3 years to bear fruit. In the meantime, stocks are not sufficient to tank Iran's capability to produce these kinds of missiles. I think that the most likely outcome is either more shipping companies negotiating terms to transit unharmed, like China's COSCO has all but admitted to have done, or these detours to continue.
  - JumpCrisscross 3y ago
    > US Navy is never going to allow stocks to go under what is necessary to stop at least a long-range Chinese attack, and that means at least 600 missiles Agree. > stocks are not sufficient to tank Iran's capability to produce these kinds of missiles My core point is it never gets to Iran making missiles, the Houthis firing them and the U.S. doing nothing more than intercepting. Well before it becomes a production contest, the situation is resolved diplomatically or escalated. > the most likely outcome is either more shipping companies negotiating terms to transit unharmed This would be difficult for a Western company to do without risking sanctions.
    - dragonwriter 3y ago
      > My core point is it never gets to the point where Iran is making missiles, the Houthis are firing them and the U.S. is doing nothing more than intercepting them. Well before it becomes a production contest, the situation is resolved diplomatically or escalated. Given the “final warning” issued 4 days ago by the coalition, I think escalation or resolution (probably the former) is very much a “sooner rather than later" thing.
BWStearns 3y ago
> Additionally, given that the expensive parts in these drones seem to be homemade in Iran (engines, fuselage, even some of the electronics), and given the sanctions, USD equiv. GDP isn't a great metric since there's no free market to convert Iranian production to USD. I wouldn't be so sure that the parts are locally sourced. [0] https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/bizarre-theft-wave-targets-same-rotax-engines-used-in-iranian-drones https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/bizarre-theft-wave-tar...
- sudosysgen 3y ago
  Not the same type of hardware. They might need larger engines for their reusable drones, but the ones they used for Shaheds are in-house clones (funnily enough, a Wankel engine for one of them). The Wikipedia pages for the suicide Shaheds has teardowns and sources.
  - BWStearns 3y ago
    huh cool. I guess the Wankel's found a niche that doesn't mind the short engine rebuild period.

JumpCrisscross 3y ago

> conflict is actually not far from being constrained by production If anyone is talking about escalation risk, production isn’t the bottleneck. We are nowhere close to being resource constrained in the Middle East. > the US Navy may find itself with insufficient stockpiles to defend itself against the PLA In a production contest it’s maximum sustainable flows, not stocks, that matter. (Stocks buy you time to get flows up.) To the extent challenging the PLA is a concern, boosting production to counter the Houthis is a net win. > ability to defend against credible Chinese saturation attacks is already marginal You’re arguing both ways. If their value is marginal, expending them now is fine. Your broader point—I think—is correct. America doesn’t want to spread itself thin. But that’s a constraint at the CVN level. Once the carrier strike force is positioned, it’s immaterial whether it’s firing off missiles or guns. Anyone positioning Iran et al v America et al is missing key pieces in the logistics of war.

sudosysgen 3y ago
The stocks are not sufficient to buy time to get the flows. There are only around 500 SM-6 missiles (long range, suitable to protect large numbers of vessels at various distances, 5mm$ each), and there is only capacity to produce a few hundred for the short to medium term. The older SM-2s may have more plentiful stocks, but most of them have been deemed too dangerous to use after causing serious damage in test firings, and there are only around 180 modernized versions available, and the missile itself is no longer produced. Defending against a saturation attack means that the value experiences a step function. Either you have enough missiles to stop most low-tech enemy missiles, and you're going to be largely fine, or you don't, and your entire fleet might sink. It's not something you can afford to. The US Navy is never going to allow stocks to go under what is necessary to stop at least a long-range Chinese attack, and that means at least 600 missiles, which is a serious chunk of what remains. Boosting production to counter the Houthis is surely something the US will do. It will take 2-3 years to bear fruit. In the meantime, stocks are not sufficient to tank Iran's capability to produce these kinds of missiles. I think that the most likely outcome is either more shipping companies negotiating terms to transit unharmed, like China's COSCO has all but admitted to have done, or these detours to continue.
- JumpCrisscross 3y ago
  > US Navy is never going to allow stocks to go under what is necessary to stop at least a long-range Chinese attack, and that means at least 600 missiles Agree. > stocks are not sufficient to tank Iran's capability to produce these kinds of missiles My core point is it never gets to Iran making missiles, the Houthis firing them and the U.S. doing nothing more than intercepting. Well before it becomes a production contest, the situation is resolved diplomatically or escalated. > the most likely outcome is either more shipping companies negotiating terms to transit unharmed This would be difficult for a Western company to do without risking sanctions.
  - dragonwriter 3y ago
    > My core point is it never gets to the point where Iran is making missiles, the Houthis are firing them and the U.S. is doing nothing more than intercepting them. Well before it becomes a production contest, the situation is resolved diplomatically or escalated. Given the “final warning” issued 4 days ago by the coalition, I think escalation or resolution (probably the former) is very much a “sooner rather than later" thing.

BWStearns 3y ago

> Additionally, given that the expensive parts in these drones seem to be homemade in Iran (engines, fuselage, even some of the electronics), and given the sanctions, USD equiv. GDP isn't a great metric since there's no free market to convert Iranian production to USD. I wouldn't be so sure that the parts are locally sourced. [0] https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/bizarre-theft-wave-targets-same-rotax-engines-used-in-iranian-drones https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/bizarre-theft-wave-tar...

sudosysgen 3y ago
Not the same type of hardware. They might need larger engines for their reusable drones, but the ones they used for Shaheds are in-house clones (funnily enough, a Wankel engine for one of them). The Wikipedia pages for the suicide Shaheds has teardowns and sources.
- BWStearns 3y ago
  huh cool. I guess the Wankel's found a niche that doesn't mind the short engine rebuild period.