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I disagree. Here's the relevant section: <quote> Then, in 1986 Congress passed a bill exempting GPOs from the anti-kickback provisions embedded in Medicare
by robomartin 15y ago
I disagree. Here's the relevant section:
<quote>
Then, in 1986 Congress passed a bill exempting GPOs from the anti-kickback provisions embedded in Medicare law. This meant that instead of collecting membership dues, GPOs could collect “fees”—in other industries they might be called kickbacks or bribes—from suppliers in the form of a share of sales revenue. (For example, in exchange for signing a contract with a given gauze maker, a GPO might get a percentage of whatever the company made selling gauze to members.) The idea was to help struggling hospitals by shifting the burden of funding GPOs’ operations to vendors. To prevent abuse, “fees” of more than 3 percent of sales were supposed to be reported to member hospitals and (upon request) the secretary of health and human services.
But, as with many well-intended laws, the shift had some ground-shaking unintended consequences. Most importantly, it turned the incentives for GPOs upside down. Instead of being tied to the dues paid by members, GPOs’ revenues were now tied to the profits of the suppliers they were supposed to be pressing for lower prices. This created an incentive to cater to the sellers rather than to the buyers—to big companies like Becton Dickinson rather than to member hospitals. Before long, large suppliers began using “fees”—sometimes very generous ones—along with tiered pricing to secure deals that locked GPO members into buying their products. In many cases, hospitals were obliged to buy virtually all of their bandages or scalpels or heart monitors from one company. GPOs also began offering package deals that bundled products together. To get the best price on stethoscopes, a hospital might have to agree to buy everything from pacemakers to cotton balls from the GPO’s preferred vendors. Hospitals went along because they got price breaks, usually in the form of rebates if they met buying quotas.
This situation only grew thornier in 1996, when the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission overhauled antitrust rules and granted the organizations protection from antitrust actions, except under “extraordinary circumstances.” Once again, the idea was to help struggling hospitals, this time by allowing the buying groups to grow big enough to negotiate the best deals for their members. But the decision led to a frenzy of consolidation. Within a few years, five GPOs controlled purchasing for 90 percent of the nation’s hospitals, which only amplified the clout of big suppliers.
</quote>
Government meddling triggered all kinds of mutations that led to the current situation in more ways than one.
- luser001 15y agoWhat you generically call "government meddling", I call (more precisely, imho) "corporation-funded, lobbyist-enabled legislative corruption".
- robomartin 15y agoWhat you generically call "government meddling", I call (more precisely, imho) "corporation-funded, lobbyist-enabled legislative corruption". This is a very popular view generally promoted in the more liberal corners of the political ecosystem. Not being in either the liberal or conservative extremes I tend to see things differently. You have to ask a few questions to get to the bottom of it: Q: What are lobbyists? A: Organizations that create a way to reach out to law-makers directly, voice opinion and have some influence on relevant matters. Q: Why do businesses use lobbyists? A: Because they can and it provides them with a way to navigate an already complex system. Q: Why are corporations able to fund lobbyist? A: Because it is legal Q: Why is it legal? A: Because politicians passed laws allowing it. Q: Why did they do that? A: Many reasons. One might be that they need that funding to stay in power. Another might be that they don't really care about us but would much rather ensure their own political existence. Yet another might be that we, the people, don't really show-up in any meaningful way on their radars outside of elections. And, finally, one more reason could be that, well, we allow it. Q: What should we do about it? A: Make it illegal. Q: Would corporations and lobbyists then be able to influence legislation? A: Maybe, but at least not through those legally-provided channels. You don't have to ask too many questions to get to the fundamental reasons behind a problem. It's hard to hide from reality. I don't have a problem with someone (or a corporation) using the available legal framework to advance their cause or standing. If the means for political influence produce bad results the system is to blame, not the user of the system. A simpler example might be in product design. If I design a chainsaw that is faster and more powerful to use I'd expect businesses to use it to gain advantage over competitors and make more money. If, as a result of this more people are getting hurt because the design isn't very sound, you don't turn around and blame the businesses using it. The design was at fault. Bad engineering. People will use what they are given to work with. Fix the problem, not the symptoms. It's not a perfect analogy, but it illustrates the fundamental idea.