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I'd challenge this argument in regards to Vietnam. I don't think the issue is that war is hard, but rather that we keep trying to attack motivated local populat
by somenameforme 3y ago
I'd challenge this argument in regards to Vietnam. I don't think the issue is that war is hard, but rather that we keep trying to attack motivated local populations. I'm sure you're aware of the old quote that, to my knowledge, originated during the Civil War about it being "a rich man's war, and a poor man's fight." And that was absolutely true. Without conscription (which the elites were of course able to sidestep), it would have been a far less brutal war. It was people who didn't want to be fighting, fighting against people who didn't want to be fighting.
In general when fighting an enemy does not want to be fighting but is being compelled to do so, I think that opens the door to a real and meaningful victory. But when you're fighting against groups of people, often with a very flat organizational structure, who blend seamlessly with the local population (in no small part because they are the local population), and who want to be fighting you? I think victory there is near to impossible.
This is how Afghanistan, a country with the GDP of a mid-sized town in a modern nation, has defeated not only the USA but also the USSR. In terms of results, they are the most powerful fighting force in the world. But the issue when fighting them is that you don't know who you're fighting. This makes ground operations near to impossible, and sends civilian casualties skyrocketing, which creates even more motivated fighters. You kill one Taliban and create 3 more.
And furthermore, these people aren't going anywhere because it's their home. For them, the conflict is a matter of their very existence. They'll fight you for decades until they die, then their children will fight you, and so on endlessly. By contrast, we're fighting with motivations like trying to avoid geopolitical embarrassment, literally. One of the leaks in the Pentagon Papers included a memo laying out our motivations. And the primary motivation, at 70%, was "To avoid a humiliating U.S. defeat (to our reputation as a guarantor)." [1]
Even if you imagine America somehow was able to "win" in Vietnam, you end up with an Afghanistan issue. What now? You can't just maintain millions of soldiers there indefinitely. And if the people you support are only able to stay in power because of those millions of soldiers, then it may turn out that the "war" you just won was merely a battle in in the real "war."
[1] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pentagon_Papers#Impact https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pentagon_Papers#Impact
- philwelch 3y ago> I don't think the issue is that war is hard, but rather that we keep trying to attack motivated local populations. The local population of South Vietnam, for the most part, did not want to be conquered by the communists, did not rise up against the South Vietnamese government during the Tet Offensive as the communists expected them to, and were, in fact, brutally conquered and suppressed by the communist armies that invaded them from the north after the United States abandoned them. Why do you think so many of them became refugees? These people were our allies and we abandoned them. You’re providing a perfect example of how the United States lost a propaganda war that had, at best, an extremely loose relationship with the reality on the ground. And the exact same thing happened in Afghanistan. The level of American presence and support for the Afghan government was minimal and would have been easily sustainable, and it had been years since a single American casualty had been suffered. The withdrawal was a completely unforced error that left billions of dollars in weapons, thousands of Afghan translators, and the biometric data to identify them all in the hands of the Taliban. It was an absolute disgrace.
- somenameforme 3y agoThe 'Afghanistan Papers' are informative - with some obvious analogs to the Pentagon Papers, it was a publication of internal military assessments in Afghanistan. [1] We assessed victory as impossible to achieve, and an increasingly large percent of all money spent on Afghanistan (as in > 40%) was ending up lost to corruption, and often going straight to the Taliban. And of course the Taliban were well integrated into the forces we were training. See - e.g. the death of General Greene in Afghanistan. And the Taliban were inflicting a higher casualty rate on "us" (including pro-US Afghan forces), than we were on them. And "we" (only American forces) suffered casualties each and every year, including during the final withdrawal. The number of our casualties was directly reflected by size of the force there - few people, few casualties, lots of people, lots of casualties. We were losing. The years of propaganda about making progress in the country was all fabricated and cynical lies, as usual. Basically Vietnam and Afghanistan suffered the exact same issue, that you're sidestepping. Without massive foreign interference Afghanistan was going to be ruled by the Taliban, which it now is. And without massive foreign interference, Vietnam was going to be communist, which it now is. The cost is not only in lives, but also financial. Afghanistan cost upwards of $2 trillion. Well and I also think we shouldn't just count wounded as write-offs. We're much better at keeping people alive, but somebody coming back with no limbs, or PTSD so bad that they're destined to find themselves on the street, are also costs rivaling death. [1] - https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/investigations/afghanistan-papers/afghanistan-war-confidential-documents/ https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/investigations/...