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How are some sea-based airplanes meant to take out the entire operational base of Houthis on the ground? Because I guess that’s what you mean by mentioning thos

How are some sea-based airplanes meant to take out the entire operational base of Houthis on the ground? Because I guess that’s what you mean by mentioning those carrier groups, i.e. US air-attacks. I agree though, it is partly a political decision because, for once, the US leaders are aware that they won’t be able to neutralize the Houthis based on sea power alone and that they (the Americans) will need men on the ground, and this is indeed a very big political no-no in this current climate. Which brings me to one of the main subjects ignored by the article and by almost all the people commenting in here, i.e. the coordination between sea power and land power, meaning becoming aware that in order to neutralize your enemy it’s very counter-productive to rely on very independent military groups (the Navy, the Army etc), each of them with their (grand) strategy and with different procurement focuses, you need to take several steps back and to “strategize” it all together. Granted, this has always been a big problem for big industrial armies and especially for the US (since the WW2, in the Americans’ case), not sure there’s an easy fix to it. But fact is you won’t be able to defeat Houthi-like troops in choke-points like Aden or Malacca without a combination between land and sea power, i.e. actually controlling those choke-points on the ground like the Brits used to do in their emperial heyday.

ranger207 3y ago
> ...you need to take several steps back and to “strategize” it all together. That was the purpose of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986. The US invasion of Grenada showed clearly that the Army, Navy, and Air Force were not working well together. Its most significant reform was that operational command bypasses the service chiefs and instead the chain of command goes from the president, through the secretary of defense, to the regional combat commanders. The services are responsible for recruitment and procurement. In Central Command (CENTCOM) which covers the middle east, all Army soldiers, Navy sailors, Marines, and Air Force airmen report to the combatant commander. At the higher levels, the service chiefs have the joint chiefs of staff to coordinate their higher-level strategies. This system has been extremely effective since the 80s. The problem in Yemen is not that the Army doesn't want to go in so it's leaving it to the Navy to fix the problem, it's that there's political issues at higher levels that prevent the Army from going in. I'm sure CENTCOM has a plan right now for sending in troops that would integrate the Army and Navy together, and is ready to execute that if ordered.
- wolverine876 3y ago
  You're right, and it's a fundamental aspect of the US military. It's fine that the GP doesn't understand, but it's not fine to speak as if they do. Jointness is decades old now. Politically, it's seems very unlikley that the US desires to send ground troops (which seem more likely to be Marines or special forces than regular Army) into Yemen. Yemen is tied up with Iran, Saudi Arabia, and a Mideast that's on a hair trigger. The US wants to de-escalate, not inflame the situation. Biden is very cautious about confrontation and military involvement anyway, but I can't imagine any president doing that. At worst, some local ally would do it with our help. More likely would be airstrikes. The US has air bases all over the region, and can fly from anywhere due to refueuling capability; they don't need a carrier to do it. If the US did conduct airstrikes, I expect they would not publicize it to avoid escalation with Iran, in Yemen, in the Mideast generally, and pulling in Saudi Arabia too. That's exactly what Hamas and possibly Iran would like to see. But the Houthi missiles aren't that big a problem, so far.

ranger207 3y ago

> ...you need to take several steps back and to “strategize” it all together. That was the purpose of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986. The US invasion of Grenada showed clearly that the Army, Navy, and Air Force were not working well together. Its most significant reform was that operational command bypasses the service chiefs and instead the chain of command goes from the president, through the secretary of defense, to the regional combat commanders. The services are responsible for recruitment and procurement. In Central Command (CENTCOM) which covers the middle east, all Army soldiers, Navy sailors, Marines, and Air Force airmen report to the combatant commander. At the higher levels, the service chiefs have the joint chiefs of staff to coordinate their higher-level strategies. This system has been extremely effective since the 80s. The problem in Yemen is not that the Army doesn't want to go in so it's leaving it to the Navy to fix the problem, it's that there's political issues at higher levels that prevent the Army from going in. I'm sure CENTCOM has a plan right now for sending in troops that would integrate the Army and Navy together, and is ready to execute that if ordered.

wolverine876 3y ago
You're right, and it's a fundamental aspect of the US military. It's fine that the GP doesn't understand, but it's not fine to speak as if they do. Jointness is decades old now. Politically, it's seems very unlikley that the US desires to send ground troops (which seem more likely to be Marines or special forces than regular Army) into Yemen. Yemen is tied up with Iran, Saudi Arabia, and a Mideast that's on a hair trigger. The US wants to de-escalate, not inflame the situation. Biden is very cautious about confrontation and military involvement anyway, but I can't imagine any president doing that. At worst, some local ally would do it with our help. More likely would be airstrikes. The US has air bases all over the region, and can fly from anywhere due to refueuling capability; they don't need a carrier to do it. If the US did conduct airstrikes, I expect they would not publicize it to avoid escalation with Iran, in Yemen, in the Mideast generally, and pulling in Saudi Arabia too. That's exactly what Hamas and possibly Iran would like to see. But the Houthi missiles aren't that big a problem, so far.