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> The US military's fundamental approach is to use sensors to see the enemy before they see us, That probably works out in the open seas, but once you approach

> The US military's fundamental approach is to use sensors to see the enemy before they see us, That probably works out in the open seas, but once you approach (enemy) land those radars that can detect anything that moves from 300 kms out are of no strategic advantage anymore, cause you do you know that there are enemies there by definition. Case in point is the current conflict against the Houthis, there's no use of the US Navy's very expensive radars when trying to counter-act some guys launching cheap drones from 30-40 nautical miles out (i.e. from the Yemeni shore). Also, in regards to the general "no-one is thinking about that" sentiment, we've had such moments in the past, when the lack of any real naval combat for decades meant that it was very hard for non-institutional actors (like this guy is) to impose their views against the mainstream consensus. The best example that I can think of is the end of the 1800s - the early 1900s, just before WW1, when almost no mainstream naval theorist was really mentioning subs (other than in passing) or the air component, everyone was focused on speed and fire-power, hence the dreadnoughts (which, looking back, did not have that big of a role to speak of, other than being money-sinkers for the Brits). To say nothing of the fact that (if I'm not entirely mistaken) naval rams made it into the 1890s for new ships, and that was only because of that one battle at Lissa in 1866. If it hadn't been for Tsushima in 1905 we would have most probably had naval rams going into WW1, because that had been the general approved consensus. And regarding fighting Chinese/Russian advanced missiles, even if the US Navy manages to implement all that tech in order to be effective against said advanced missiles nothing stops the Chinese/Russians from adopting Houthi tactics, i.e. resorting to using cheap drones/cheap "missiles" when the US Navy will approach their (China's and Russia's) shores. Just look at how fast Russia was at copying Ukraine's tactics of using cheap "suicide" drones against tanks and other armoured vehicles, nothing will stop the same Russians from using cheap drones against a big and expensive US warship approaching Vladivostok, for example.

ranger207 3y ago
> Case in point is the current conflict against the Houthis, there's no use of the US Navy's very expensive radars when trying to counter-act some guys launching cheap drones from 30-40 nautical miles out (i.e. from the Yemeni shore). There's no evidence of that. The US is not attacking the Houthi bases, period. It's not a matter of technical capabilities, it's political reasons. If the US wanted to end Houthi attacks on shipping tomorrow, then there's a couple of carrier groups in range that would stop that pretty quickly. Now, why those political limits are in place is a very good question that I would like to know the answer to as well
- paganel 3y ago
  How are some sea-based airplanes meant to take out the entire operational base of Houthis on the ground? Because I guess that’s what you mean by mentioning those carrier groups, i.e. US air-attacks. I agree though, it is partly a political decision because, for once, the US leaders are aware that they won’t be able to neutralize the Houthis based on sea power alone and that they (the Americans) will need men on the ground, and this is indeed a very big political no-no in this current climate. Which brings me to one of the main subjects ignored by the article and by almost all the people commenting in here, i.e. the coordination between sea power and land power, meaning becoming aware that in order to neutralize your enemy it’s very counter-productive to rely on very independent military groups (the Navy, the Army etc), each of them with their (grand) strategy and with different procurement focuses, you need to take several steps back and to “strategize” it all together. Granted, this has always been a big problem for big industrial armies and especially for the US (since the WW2, in the Americans’ case), not sure there’s an easy fix to it. But fact is you won’t be able to defeat Houthi-like troops in choke-points like Aden or Malacca without a combination between land and sea power, i.e. actually controlling those choke-points on the ground like the Brits used to do in their emperial heyday.
  - ranger207 3y ago
    > ...you need to take several steps back and to “strategize” it all together. That was the purpose of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986. The US invasion of Grenada showed clearly that the Army, Navy, and Air Force were not working well together. Its most significant reform was that operational command bypasses the service chiefs and instead the chain of command goes from the president, through the secretary of defense, to the regional combat commanders. The services are responsible for recruitment and procurement. In Central Command (CENTCOM) which covers the middle east, all Army soldiers, Navy sailors, Marines, and Air Force airmen report to the combatant commander. At the higher levels, the service chiefs have the joint chiefs of staff to coordinate their higher-level strategies. This system has been extremely effective since the 80s. The problem in Yemen is not that the Army doesn't want to go in so it's leaving it to the Navy to fix the problem, it's that there's political issues at higher levels that prevent the Army from going in. I'm sure CENTCOM has a plan right now for sending in troops that would integrate the Army and Navy together, and is ready to execute that if ordered.
wolverine876 3y ago
>> The US military's fundamental approach is to use sensors to see the enemy before they see us, > That probably works out in the open seas, but once you approach (enemy) land those radars that can detect anything that moves from 300 kms out are of no strategic advantage anymore, cause you do you know that there are enemies there by definition. But that's in fact the US tactic in all domains, sea, land, air, and even space, and they've invested heavily in it for ~35 years: it first was used in the Gulf War (to great effect) in the early 1990s. Knowing the enemies are there is necessary, of course, but not sufficient. The sensor network's purpose is to pinpoint and track the enemies (who may move) so that they can be struck with precision missiles. (That's the reason the military built GPS, not for second lieutenants who can't manage a compass.) Also, ships fighting a near-peer adversary (not Houthis with a few missiles, but China or Russia) need to focus on the air - that's where naval battles have been fought since Midway in WWII. The ships won't be near land anyway until the enemy is suppressed; carrier planes have a ~500 mile combat radius, without refueling, and that's not even enough any more due to precision missiles. > Also, in regards to the general "no-one is thinking about that" sentiment, we've had such moments in the past, when the lack of any real naval combat for decades meant that it was very hard for non-institutional actors (like this guy is) to impose their views against the mainstream consensus. That is a problem, though less of one in an open society where such things are extensively and publicly debated. But it's not an argument for the OP's point-of-view; they actually need to substantiate it, that would be an argument. As it is, they don't know basic information. > nothing will stop the same Russians from using cheap drones against a big and expensive US warship approaching Vladivostok, for example. I'm not sure what I said that disagrees? I wouldn't say 'nothing'; there's a lot of anti-drone technology, and a lot of anti-air technology on ships, but yes that's a real threat. The navy doesn't plan to approach coastlines under fire, as far as I know; the Marines have greatly deemphasized amphibious landings, for example, in part because - for reasons you say, and due to precision munitions more generally - there's no way to station ships offshore and then to move amphibious craft to the beach.

ranger207 3y ago

> Case in point is the current conflict against the Houthis, there's no use of the US Navy's very expensive radars when trying to counter-act some guys launching cheap drones from 30-40 nautical miles out (i.e. from the Yemeni shore). There's no evidence of that. The US is not attacking the Houthi bases, period. It's not a matter of technical capabilities, it's political reasons. If the US wanted to end Houthi attacks on shipping tomorrow, then there's a couple of carrier groups in range that would stop that pretty quickly. Now, why those political limits are in place is a very good question that I would like to know the answer to as well

paganel 3y ago
How are some sea-based airplanes meant to take out the entire operational base of Houthis on the ground? Because I guess that’s what you mean by mentioning those carrier groups, i.e. US air-attacks. I agree though, it is partly a political decision because, for once, the US leaders are aware that they won’t be able to neutralize the Houthis based on sea power alone and that they (the Americans) will need men on the ground, and this is indeed a very big political no-no in this current climate. Which brings me to one of the main subjects ignored by the article and by almost all the people commenting in here, i.e. the coordination between sea power and land power, meaning becoming aware that in order to neutralize your enemy it’s very counter-productive to rely on very independent military groups (the Navy, the Army etc), each of them with their (grand) strategy and with different procurement focuses, you need to take several steps back and to “strategize” it all together. Granted, this has always been a big problem for big industrial armies and especially for the US (since the WW2, in the Americans’ case), not sure there’s an easy fix to it. But fact is you won’t be able to defeat Houthi-like troops in choke-points like Aden or Malacca without a combination between land and sea power, i.e. actually controlling those choke-points on the ground like the Brits used to do in their emperial heyday.
- ranger207 3y ago
  > ...you need to take several steps back and to “strategize” it all together. That was the purpose of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986. The US invasion of Grenada showed clearly that the Army, Navy, and Air Force were not working well together. Its most significant reform was that operational command bypasses the service chiefs and instead the chain of command goes from the president, through the secretary of defense, to the regional combat commanders. The services are responsible for recruitment and procurement. In Central Command (CENTCOM) which covers the middle east, all Army soldiers, Navy sailors, Marines, and Air Force airmen report to the combatant commander. At the higher levels, the service chiefs have the joint chiefs of staff to coordinate their higher-level strategies. This system has been extremely effective since the 80s. The problem in Yemen is not that the Army doesn't want to go in so it's leaving it to the Navy to fix the problem, it's that there's political issues at higher levels that prevent the Army from going in. I'm sure CENTCOM has a plan right now for sending in troops that would integrate the Army and Navy together, and is ready to execute that if ordered.

wolverine876 3y ago

>> The US military's fundamental approach is to use sensors to see the enemy before they see us, > That probably works out in the open seas, but once you approach (enemy) land those radars that can detect anything that moves from 300 kms out are of no strategic advantage anymore, cause you do you know that there are enemies there by definition. But that's in fact the US tactic in all domains, sea, land, air, and even space, and they've invested heavily in it for ~35 years: it first was used in the Gulf War (to great effect) in the early 1990s. Knowing the enemies are there is necessary, of course, but not sufficient. The sensor network's purpose is to pinpoint and track the enemies (who may move) so that they can be struck with precision missiles. (That's the reason the military built GPS, not for second lieutenants who can't manage a compass.) Also, ships fighting a near-peer adversary (not Houthis with a few missiles, but China or Russia) need to focus on the air - that's where naval battles have been fought since Midway in WWII. The ships won't be near land anyway until the enemy is suppressed; carrier planes have a ~500 mile combat radius, without refueling, and that's not even enough any more due to precision missiles. > Also, in regards to the general "no-one is thinking about that" sentiment, we've had such moments in the past, when the lack of any real naval combat for decades meant that it was very hard for non-institutional actors (like this guy is) to impose their views against the mainstream consensus. That is a problem, though less of one in an open society where such things are extensively and publicly debated. But it's not an argument for the OP's point-of-view; they actually need to substantiate it, that would be an argument. As it is, they don't know basic information. > nothing will stop the same Russians from using cheap drones against a big and expensive US warship approaching Vladivostok, for example. I'm not sure what I said that disagrees? I wouldn't say 'nothing'; there's a lot of anti-drone technology, and a lot of anti-air technology on ships, but yes that's a real threat. The navy doesn't plan to approach coastlines under fire, as far as I know; the Marines have greatly deemphasized amphibious landings, for example, in part because - for reasons you say, and due to precision munitions more generally - there's no way to station ships offshore and then to move amphibious craft to the beach.