> I think, particularly with the advent of AI and modern computer technology as a whole, Gödel would today be a simulationist of Bostrom’s cut One of my favour

> I think, particularly with the advent of AI and modern computer technology as a whole, Gödel would today be a simulationist of Bostrom’s cut One of my favourite parts of Bostrom’s seminal paper is an aside, but one I feel would have appealed to Gödel had he lived to read it: > Reality may thus contain many levels. Even if it is necessary for the hierarchy to bottom out at some stage – the metaphysical status of this claim is somewhat obscure Bostrom’s argument, although it starts from materialist premises, contains within it an anti-materialist potential: What if there is no basement universe? What if it is software all the way down? Given Gödel’s anti-materialism, I think that potential would have appealed to him