On the other hand, files edited through a flow like `sudoedit(1)` get copied into /var/tmp with mode 0600 and edited under the user's editor. This is in some wa

On the other hand, files edited through a flow like `sudoedit(1)` get copied into /var/tmp with mode 0600 and edited under the user's editor. This is in some ways much better than something like `sudo vim`, since that's a lot of privilege to be granting to a large attack surface. But it does create files like ~/.undodir/%var%tmp%shadow.XXcFqVH3: also with mode 0600, but they stick around even after sudoedit(1) terminates. So I think that it's fair to say that it is a nonzero security risk because it creates persistent copies of potentially sensitive files. Aside from just a strict Unix permissions model, I think it's also easy to imagine cases where you create a sensitive file, edit it, delete it, and expect it to be really deleted. Or even just use Vim as a scratch buffer with no name! Yet undodir persists data in these cases, too.