> No, they just accept the risk and haven’t developed a system that can address it (like electronic voting machines). Want to describe this risk? You mark a ba

> No, they just accept the risk and haven’t developed a system that can address it (like electronic voting machines). Want to describe this risk? You mark a ballot, throw it in a box with hundreds of other ballots - how do you risk getting identified? > And somehow magically know when this particular device is in a testing room (it’s random assignment for a reason). Do I have to explain the purpose of the radio-bitflip a third time? > Paper ballots can be easily modified at the time of counting, there is no feasible way of verifying individual votes at scale or even trying to detect such fraud - this was happening in the north of Brazil decades ago and is actually one of the main reasons the electronic voting was developed! If there's no way to even detect such fraud, how do we know it was happening? You've just demonstrated why a paper trail is necessary - to discover fraud. Yes, in corrupt countries like Brazil, voting machines in addition to paper are necessary to combat systemic fraud. But you've put words in my mouth that, when I said "paper trail", I meant "only paper, no computer". > instead of creating fantasy scenarios that for some reason an army of security researchers failed to consider but you did. Plenty researchers consider only-electronic voting dangerous, and the EFF calls a paper trail a baseline best practice [1], and Schneier notes "computer security experts are unanimous on what to do (some voting experts disagree, but it is the computer security experts who need to be listened to; the problems here are with the computer, not with the fact that the computer is being used in a voting application)... DRE machines must have a voter-verifiable paper audit trails... Software used on DRE machines must be open to public scrutiny" [2]. Besides, despite your phrasing trying to make this about my ego, I didn't come up with any of the techniques described - others have done that. Nor did I say the security experts in charge of Brazil's election system [3] didn't consider it. They probably did, but figured the risk was low enough, or the politicians in charge made that choice for them. I, and many other experts, disagree - but for some reason only the opinion of the experts in Brazil counts, and that of the experts in countries that didn't introduce, or introduced and abandoned, pure-e-voting, doesn't. Because this way you can make it about my ego, and make it seem like I'm the only one opposed. Perhaps if you stood on firmer ground, you wouldn't have to invent motives and put words in my mouth to argue. > Memory content is also encrypted And the key to this encryption is in memory itself, and an attacker has the source code of the voting software that will run (every political party gets access to it, as well as a few institutions, per wikipedia) and has built the hardware it will run on. [1] https://www.eff.org/issues/e-voting https://www.eff.org/issues/e-voting [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electronic_voting https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electronic_voting [3] I hope security experts continue to be in charge indefinitely, and they're not replaced by more politically useful people, invisibly subverting elections, because all voters get to see is a black box.